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Introduction
This thesis is a defense of pyrrhonian skepticism. Given this, we might do well to ask what
exactly pyrrhonian skepticism is. This is a contentious issue in itself, and will be taken up in more
detail in the first chapter, but we can give a few general points of characterization. First, and perhaps
most obviously, pyrrhonian skepticism is a school of skepticism originating with Pyrrho of Elis, an
ancient Greek philosopher who lived sometime between 360 and 270 BCE. More substantively, we
can broadly say that a pyrrhonian skeptic is one who thinks we ought to suspend judgment on all of
our beliefs, no matter what. We can distinguish pyrrhonian skepticism from its better-known cousin,
“external world” or “cartesian” skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is a skepticism focused on
knowledge, and more specifically about our knowledge of the external world: the cartesian skeptic
argues that we cannot be sure of the knowledge we take ourselves to have about the external world,
and thus ought to suspend judgment on it instead. The pyrrhonian skeptic is broader in both senses:
their skepticism is a skepticism focused on belief rather than just knowledge, and it applies across
the board, to all beliefs rather than just beliefs about the external world. It should be noted that
throughout the thesis, I will often use the terms “skepticism,” “skeptical,” and variants to mean
“pyrrhonian skepticism,” “pyrrhonian,” etc.
I said that this thesis was a defense of pyrrhonian skepticism, and indeed, skepticism could
probably use a defender. Calling oneself a skeptic, especially a pyrrhonian skeptic, has not been a
particularly popular position in philosophy since at least late antiquity (Frede 1984, 273), and has
only continued to wane in popularity since then. Since the time of Sextus Empiricus, the last great
skeptical author that we know of (and the only pyrrhonian from whom we have enough work to
form a real opinion of), skepticism has transformed from a real position held by real philosophers
into a strawman position to be constantly set up and defeated in order to clear the way for non-
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skeptical philosophy. As Myles Burnyeat puts it, ‘the skeptic’ has become “the name of something
internal to the philosopher’s own thinking, [their] alter ego as it were” (Burnyeat 2012, 344). Even
among those few who have recently identified as skeptics in at least a broadly pyrrhonian sense, the
question of what implications that position would have for the avowed skeptic’s form of life has not
been posed. Such modern skeptics, like Robert Fogelin and Peter Unger, prefer to focus on the ways
that the skeptical position interacts with received philosophical views such as those on knowledge
(Unger 1975, Fogelin 1994).
Really, this makes quite a lot of sense. Why would we want to give up our beliefs? Beliefs are
important to us, so the fact that philosophers don’t take the idea of giving them up seriously isn’t
overly surprising. But, as we have stated, this was not always the case. In antiquity, pyrrhonian
skepticism was put forth and defended as both a philosophical position and a way of life. From
Pyrrho himself up through Sextus, there was a lineage of thinkers who took pyrrhonian skepticism
not as an obstacle to be overcome, but as a position to defend or a goal to be achieved. This lineage
of pyrrhonian thinkers had a rich history and would undoubtably be a bountiful source of
competing viewpoints on what it would mean to lead a pyrrhonian life – indeed, modern scholarship
almost universally suggests that Pyrrho and his followers’ skepticism differed greatly from the later
“pyrrhonian” skepticism of Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus (c.f. Bett 2000 and Vogt et al. 2015).
Unfortunately, the vast majority of that tradition has been lost, leaving us with only a few fragments
from various pyrrhonists (most importantly Timon, a pupil of Pyrrho’s); a number of second- and
third-hand accounts of pyrrhonists (including some describing Pyrrho himself); and only two
complete major works of pyrrhonism, both by the same author: the Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against
the Academicians of Sextus Empiricus.
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Accordingly, I will use Sextus’ Outlines as a jumping-off point for my own argument. Chapter
1 will examine the question of what it would mean to live as a skeptic through an examination of the
interpretive scholarship surrounding Sextus’ characterization of the pyrrhonist life (as well as a
consideration of Pyrrho’s own life). It will examine the two major sides in that debate (the “rustic”
and “urbane” interpreters) before introducing the contemporary concept of “alief” in order to argue
that there is not as much separating the two camps as is traditionally assumed. Ultimately, I will
argue that the skeptical life can be defined as one lived with all aliefs and no beliefs (in the technical
sense of those terms that we will make clear).
With the characterization of the skeptical life we developed in the first chapter in mind,
Chapter 2 will provide an argument for why we should want to be skeptics. This argument will focus
on instances of “norm-discordant aliefs” as problem cases that can motivate the skeptical life. I will
argue that the pyrrhonian form of life is uniquely qualified to deal with cases of conflict between
epistemic commitments (such as norm-discordant alief) due to the adjustability of aliefs.
Finally, Chapter 3 will address an objection to the case for pyrrhonian skepticism laid out in
Chapter 2. Specifically, the objection, adapted from David Hume and P.F. Strawson’s anti-skeptical
arguments, will be that some aliefs are not adjustable. Against this, I will argue that while there are
some aliefs that may not be changeable on an individual level, all aliefs are changeable on at least a
historical level.
Currently, skepticism is not taken very seriously as a philosophical position in its own right.
Hopefully this thesis will provide some reason to take it more seriously – as a position with actual
defenders who have some good reasons for defending it rather than simply a philosophical error to
be overcome.
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Chapter 1: What Does it Mean to Live as a Skeptic?
The goal of this chapter is to survey the literature on the question of what it would mean to
live the life of a pyrrhonian skeptic. As discussed in the introduction, there is little firsthand evidence
for what the skeptics took themselves to be doing besides the work of Sextus Empiricus. Sextus,
then, is the pyrrhonist from whom we have the most to work with, and considerations of
pyrrhonian skepticism thus generally focus on his particular brand of it. In one sense, this is
disappointing: it would, of course, be preferable to have a fuller picture of the debate in which
Sextus was engaged. From another perspective, though, things aren’t so bad. Sextus’ philosophy is
rich, and there has been a robust interpretive debate over what exactly his proposed skeptical form
of life would look like. Historians of philosophy have mainly split into two interpretive camps in this
debate: the so-called “rustic” and “urbane” interpretations of Sextus. While these are the two
traditional ways of viewing Sextus’ skepticism, I will argue that, in fact, they have more in common
than the traditional terms of the debate would suggest. This will be accomplished through the
introduction of Tamar Gendler’s notion of “alief” to characterize what a rustic interpreter might call
a “feeling” or “seeming” and what an urbane interpreter would call a “non-dogmatic belief.” Using
the idea of an alief as a guide (along with a consideration of Diogenes Laertius’s account of Pyrrho’s
life), I will then attempt to answer the question of what a skeptic’s life might look like.
Preliminary Note on Defining Pyrrhonism and the Outlines of the Debate
If our guiding question is “what would it mean to lead a pyrrhonist life,” it would be useful
to have a definition of pyrrhonism. Of course, the debate we are about to enter is in many ways a
debate over exactly this question – the different interpretations offered amount to different
interpretations of what it means to be a pyrrhonist (or at least, to be a sextan pyrrhonist). Despite
this, we can identify some broad guidelines that both interpretations will agree with. First, the
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pyrrhonist, at the very least, holds no definite beliefs about reality or about the truth of any matter,
instead suspending judgment on such questions. Sextus defines skepticism as “an ability to set out
oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by which,
because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of
judgement and afterwards to tranquility” (Sextus I.8). This suspension of judgment, for him, leads
the skeptic “to hold no beliefs” (Sextus I.12).
However, what Sextus means by “holding no beliefs” is called into question by a second
point of agreement: the skeptic assents (or acquiesces) to appearances (or impressions). As Sextus
puts it:
When we say that Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not take ‘belief’ in the sense in which some say,
quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something; for Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon
them by appearances – for example, they would not say, when heated or chilled, ‘I think I am not
heated (or: chilled). Rather, we say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that
belief is assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences; for Pyrrhonists do not assent
to anything unclear” (Sextus I.13).

This passage will be the focus of quite a bit of the scholarly debate surrounding Sextus’ pyrrhonism,
but among the different positions staked out on it, no one would deny that it is of extreme
importance to his view. What exactly this assent or acquiescing consists in, though, along with what
exactly constitutes an impression, will be two of the main axes along which interpretive differences
in Sextus scholarship run.
Finally, all agree that Sextus’ understanding of suspension of judgment does not close off
inquiry on the matter being considered, but rather results in some sort of continued searching or
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seeking regarding it.1 Sextus draws a distinction between “Dogmatists” who “think that they have
discovered the truth,” “Academics”2 who “have asserted that things cannot be apprehended,” and
“Sceptics” who “are still investigating” (Sextus I.3). We are not presently concerned with offering a
more specific version of pyrrhonism to defend, and so for now, these general guidelines will suffice
to guide us in our main question. The skeptic is someone who, for some reason or another, has
decided to suspend judgment on at least these questions in this way. Our question is merely what
consequences that decision would have for their life.
Sextus 1: The Urbane Skeptic
The first version of Sextus Empiricus we will examine is the so-called urbane skeptic. In his
1982 paper “The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist,” which we will return to in the next section for its
argumentative merits, Jonathan Barnes sets out a distinction that would become key to the debate
over Sextus interpretation: the “urbane” vs. the “rustic” skeptic. For Barnes, “the urbane Pyrrhonist
is happy to believe most of the things that ordinary people assent to in the course of events: he
directs [suspension of judgment] towards a specific target – roughly speaking, towards philosophical
and scientific matters.” The rustic pyrrhonist, on the other hand, “has no beliefs whatsoever: he
directs [suspension of judgement] towards every issue that may arise” (Barnes 3-4).

Consider the following passages from Frede, Burnyeat, and Barnes:
“The sceptic has no stake in the truth of the impression he is left with. He is ever ready to consider the matter further, to
change his mind. He has no attachment to the impressions he is left with. He is not responsible for having them, he did
not seek them out.” – Frede 1984, 265
“The sceptic goes on seeking not in the sense that he has an active programme of research but in the sense – that he
continues to regard it as an open question whether p or not-p is the case, at least for any first-level proposition
concerning real existence.” – Burnyeat 2012, 233
“A Pyrrhonist's researches do not end in discovery; nor yet do they conclude that discovery is impossible. For they do
not terminate at all: the researches continue” – Barnes 1982, 1
2 “Academics” refers here to the so-called skeptical phase of the ancient Academy (the same one founded by Plato).
Sextus identifies the position of the academy with a sort of negative dogmatism in which we are definitively judged to be
incapable of apprehending the truth, although there is some debate over how accurate that depiction is.
1
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Michael Frede’s 1979 paper “The Skeptic’s Beliefs” could be seen as the starting point of
the modern interpretive debate surrounding Sextus Empiricus, as well as the first expression of the
urbane interpretation. In it, Frede argues against the historically received view of pyrrhonian
skepticism, which is broadly rustic. Frede suggests, on the contrary, that the skeptic’s skepticism is,
in effect, limited. For Frede, “although there is a sense in which the skeptic has no beliefs about how
things are – namely, he has no beliefs about how things really are – there is a perfectly good sense in
which he does have beliefs about how things are – namely, to the extent that it seems to be the case
that things are so or so” (Frede 1979, 186). Frede’s position, then, is that the skeptic suspends their
judgment on beliefs about the truth (“how things really are”) but is perfectly happy to have beliefs
about how things seem to them. For Frede, the skeptic is skeptical of claims about deeper reality, or
the “true nature” of the world, but not at all doubtful of their own experiences. The key sextan
concept of assenting to appearances is understood, on this interpretation, to consist in forming
beliefs about one’s own impressions.
But if assenting to appearances means forming beliefs about impressions while rejecting
beliefs about reality, it is important to determine what exactly an impression is. For Frede, the
distinction between these two sorts of beliefs (which he also calls “dogmatic” and “non-dogmatic”
beliefs) is content-neutral. As he says: “it is not the content of theoretical views … that makes them
dogmatic views; it is, rather, the attitude of the dogmatist who believes his rationalist science actually
answers questions, actually gives him good reasons for believing his theoretical doctrines” (Frede
1979, 195). This means that any belief is open to both a dogmatic and a non-dogmatic
interpretation. Sextus’ famous example is honey being sweet: we might say either merely that some
honey seems sweet to me (the non-dogmatic interpretation) or that, in some sense, it is true that the
honey is sweet, independently of our impressions of it (the dogmatic interpretation). As Burnyeat
will make clear (although Frede clearly implicitly agrees with the point), the category of impressions

8

here is not restricted to sense impressions. We might have the impression, for example, “that not
every impression is true” (Burnyeat 2012, 217), or even that, “given [some] standards, nothing will
pass [their] test and hence that nothing is, or even can be, known” (Frede 1984, 266). These are
impressions not about the properties of some external object, but about internal mental content.
Importantly, though, while a dogmatist would defend these positions absolutely, believing that the
arguments that have led them to those conclusions are absolutely correct, the skeptic, if questioned
about their position, would merely say that they believe in these positions because things seem to
them to be so. The basic point here is that Frede believes that the skeptic can assent in a nondogmatic way to all sorts of impressions, from the impression that something looks or smells a
certain way to the impression that a certain argument is convincing, all without committing
themselves to a belief about the truth of the matter. “Certain things just seem to [the skeptic] to be
the case; the skeptic has no theory on how or why this is so” (Frede 1979, 192).
The urbane skeptic, then, can maintain almost any belief they started with, so long as they
believe it merely as something that seems such-and-such way to them rather than as something that is
true. If this is so, what are the implications for the skeptical form of life? In fact, on this
interpretation, the skeptical life is not so different from a normal life. Frede identifies two ways that
the skeptic differs from “the man on the street”: Frede believes that the man on the street is most
likely dogmatic about at least some beliefs, particularly moral or political ones, while the skeptic is
non-dogmatic about all beliefs; and the skeptic is aware, in contrast to the man on the street, that
“things might, in reality, be quite different from how they appear to be” (Frede 1979, 198). Of
course, we will have to take “is aware” in the second point in a non-dogmatic manner: the skeptic
merely has the impression that things may be different from how they seem to him.
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These differences, though, are not enormous, and the urbane skeptic would not, in fact, have
to make too many changes to their form of life. The skeptic could still be fully confident in their
impressions of the world and act accordingly with just a slight tweak in wording – the skeptic, just
like the dogmatist, might still seek honey and avoid flames, but because they believe that the honey
seems sweet and that flames seem hot, not because they believe that honey is sweet or that flames are
hot. The skeptic can even still engage in conversation and specifically might engage in conversation
about their beliefs. Of course, while the person asking what the skeptic believes might understand
the question along dogmatic lines, the skeptic will not, but this will not stop the conversation from
occurring and being understood on both sides (Frede 1979, 197-198; Frede 1984, 277).
To sum up then, the urbane skeptic (as defended by Frede) has beliefs about how things
seem to them, but no beliefs whatsoever about how things truly are. Despite this difference, the
skeptic’s life is not particularly distinct from our everyday lives – the skeptic acts on the basis of their
non-dogmatic beliefs in much the same way that the “man on the street” acts on the basis of his
dogmatic ones. The only major difference in the urbane skeptical form of life seems to be that the
skeptic, in their non-dogmatic way, will be open to impressions that conflict with their past
impressions. The urbane skeptic “has no stake in the truth of the impressions he is left with. He is
ever ready to consider the matter further, to change his mind. He has no attachment to the
impressions he is left with” (Frede 1984, 265).
Sextus 2: The Rustic Skeptic
The other major interpretation in the debate is the rustic interpretation, on which Sextus’
skeptic is said to suspend judgment on every possible issue, going through life with no beliefs
whatsoever. The first proponent of this interpretation in the modern history of philosophy literature
is generally considered to be Myles Burnyeat, with his 1980 paper “Can the Sceptic Live His
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Scepticism?” Despite its importance in shaping the debate we are concerned with, much of the
argument in this paper is philological or historical in nature, so we will focus more on the second
major defender of the rustic position: Jonathan Barnes.
For any rustic skeptic, the question of assent to appearances will be key. If the skeptic
assents or acquiesces to appearances in some way, it is difficult to see how they could do so without
adopting some Frede-like position in which they believe something about those appearances. The
rustic, though, wants their skeptic to believe nothing at all. The key development that allows Barnes’
rustic interpretation of Sextus to get past this problem is his introduction of the concept of
“avowal.” An avowal is a speech act much like a child’s cry: “children cry when they are in pain: they
thereby express their pain, but they do not state that they are in pain (they state nothing at all)” and
similarly, “adults, when they are in pain, may utter the sentence ‘I am in pain’ (or some vulgar
equivalent): they thereby express their pain, but they do not (according to Wittgenstein) state that they
are in pain (they state nothing at all)” (Barnes 5). With avowals, there is a clear way in which the
skeptic can acquiesce to an impression like pain or sweetness without thereby committing themselves
to a belief about that impression. We can say that a statement is to a belief what an avowal is to a
seeming.3
Barnes’ skeptic, then, really does go through life without any beliefs. They do not believe
anything, and so they make no statements, but they make plenty of avowals that express the way certain
things seem to them (expressing being the operative verb here as a contrast to stating a fact about
how things seem to them). With this new option of avowal open to them, a rustic skeptical life is
now possible – the skeptic really can live with no beliefs whatsoever.

A “seeming” here is synonymous with “impression” as used above, although it seems a preferable choice of
terminology for our purposes since it is easier to conceptualize the more abstract, mental impressions as “seemings”
rather than “impressions,” which is heavily associated with sense-impressions specifically.
3
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So what does the avowal-driven skeptical life look like for Barnes? In fact, as in Frede, it
looks fairly similar to normal life. It should be noted that this is more a function of Barnes’
exegetical task than any philosophical position he holds. Following a passage from Sextus, Barnes’
rustic skeptic is driven by four major forces: the necessity of affections, the teaching of arts, the
tradition of custom and rules, and natural instruction (Sextus I.23-24). Barnes is less concerned with
what a rustic skeptic’s life might look like than with explaining how to square what Sextus says about
what his life does look like with the rustic interpretation. He accomplishes this task by applying
avowal to the four forces. For the necessity of affections, Barnes gives the example of hunger or
thirst. The skeptic is driven to food and drink simply by the fact that they are (or that they feel)
hungry and thirsty – there is no need to add on that they also believe themselves to be hungry and
thirsty (Barnes 13). If the skeptic says “I am hungry,” they are merely avowing a feeling, not stating a
belief. They do not believe that they should eat, it merely seems to them that it would be good to do
so. The other three forces are explained similarly. The skeptic may feel themselves to be simply
“attempting to impart a power or skill to [someone else] … not trying to give him any beliefs” (Barnes
14). The skeptic follows customs not because they believe it is the right thing to do, or even because
they believe it is the custom to do so, but simply “because that is the done thing” – as with the food
and drink case, the skeptic simply feels inclined to do so (Barnes 15). Finally, natural necessity allows
the skeptic the power of inference. The skeptic will avow “it looks like smoke” and will then
naturally feel themselves inclined to subsequently avow “it looks like fire” – in this case, Barnes
claims that the skeptic “makes no inference at all, strictly speaking; rather, as Sextus says, nature
‘leads him’ to the second [impression]” (Barnes 17). Barnes’ rustic skeptic simply feels certain ways,
and expresses those feelings in a manner that does not imply beliefs.
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Bringing Together the Urbane and the Rustic
Most of the difference between the urbane and rustic interpretations of Sextus hinges on
what exactly it means to “believe” something. Barnes makes a clear distinction between statements
and affirmations of belief on the one hand and avowals of feelings or seemings on the other. For
him, affirmation, and with it belief, depends on the possession of “a criterion of truth” (Barnes 11).
Or, to put it into more modern language: to believe is to believe true. Of course, the skeptic does
not have any such criterion of truth, and so they do not hold any beliefs at all.
Let’s compare this with Frede’s position on belief. Frede doesn’t offer a definition of belief
in general, but he is very clear on the distinction between the kind of belief he thinks the skeptic has
and the kind that they don’t have. What the urbane skeptic lacks is beliefs about “how things are in
reality” or “how things really are” (Frede 191). However, Frede is quick to counter the objection that
if the skeptic suspends judgment on all beliefs, then they must be left solely with mental states like
“it seems to me that x… it seems to me that y…” On the contrary, he tells us, the skeptic “will not
think that it only seems as if things were so and so; for that thought presupposes that he believes
what the dogmatists believe, namely, that, in reality, things are quite different from the way they
seem to be” (Frede 191). So the skeptic will not think things like “it seems to me that the honey is
sweet,” they will merely think “the honey is sweet.” Importantly though, while they may be using the
same words a dogmatist might, their meaning is vastly different when the skeptic speaks them. While
they are describing how things are they do not take themselves to be describing how they truly are, or
how they are in reality – as Frede puts it: “it does not follow that the skeptic has no beliefs about how
things are just in virtue of his suspending judgment about how they are in reality” (Frede 192).
At first blush, these two positions seem basically opposed to each other: Barnes explicitly
builds his position off of the premise that the skeptic’s basic mental states are seemings and their
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statements reports of those seemings, while Frede explicitly rejects seemings as a basis for skeptical
mental states. But let’s take a closer look. In fact, Frede’s argument for why the skeptic’s mental
states are better described as beliefs than as seemings is fairly limited. Really, what he tells us is that
the skeptic will not, in the suspended state, take themselves to be dealing with mere seemings. It is an
argument for why a skeptic would think to themselves “the honey is sweet” rather than “it seems to
me that the honey is sweet.” This position, however, does not preclude the possibility that, viewed
from a third-person perspective, those mental states might, in fact, seem to be best described as
seemings. And if we go back and look at Frede’s position with this in mind, it seems that this is
exactly what is going on. Indeed, Frede ultimately tells us that “the skeptic will be content with
whatever seems to him to be the case” (Frede 196).
This is key: even when Frede himself is looking at the urbane skeptic’s mental states from a
third-person perspective, he describes those states in the language of seemings. So Frede’s skeptic,
while not consciously realizing that their mental states are seemings, in fact seems to only have
mental states which are seemings. Frede uses the word “belief” to describe these mental states
because he believes it is truer to the phenomenological experience of being a skeptic – he thinks that
because the content of the skeptic’s thought is still “the honey is sweet” rather than “the honey
seems sweet,” it makes more sense to call that mental state a belief than a seeming or an impression.
However, with this in mind, it is unclear that anything besides terminology separates his account of
mental states under full skeptical suspension of judgement from Barnes’ account. Both seem to leave
us with a skeptic who has no beliefs about the truth of the situation around them, but plenty of
seemings about it, which they express through avowals.
Both Barnes and Frede, then, ultimately agree on the main tenets of skeptical mental life: the
skeptic accepts how things seem to them and their statements are reports on those seemings rather
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than assertions having to do with anything about the reality beyond how things seem to them. Still
though, we might wonder what exactly all this means. The notion of a “seeming” is vague at best
and both authors seem unable to stick to one consistent way of characterizing the skeptic’s mental
state – jumping from “feelings” to “how things seem” to “how things are” etc. Perhaps a more
modern perspective can help.
Skepticism and Alief
In order to better elucidate the concept of a “seeming” in Barnes (and, as we have just
shown, in Frede, although he doesn’t use the word), we will turn to Tamar Gendler’s notion of
“alief.” Since alief is characterized at least in part by its relationship to belief, let’s begin there.
Gendler intentionally does not put many constraints on her definition of truth, but she does assert
that “whatever belief is … it is normatively governed by the following constraint: belief aims to
‘track truth’ in the sense that belief is subject to immediate revision in the face of changes in our allthings-considered evidence” (Gendler 2008b, 565). So far, this seems to fit in quite nicely with our
characterization of skepticism: beliefs (which the skeptic, of course, doesn’t like) aim to track “how
things really are,” which doesn’t seem too far off from aiming to “track truth.”
So if Gendler shares a similar view of belief with the skeptic, what exactly is alief? Gendler tells
us that “a paradigmatic alief is a mental state with associatively linked content that is
representational, affective and behavioral, and that is activated—consciously or nonconsciously—by
features of the subject’s internal or ambient environment” (Gendler 2008a, 642). The fact that all
aliefs have representational, affective, and behavioral content is particularly important to note. To
illustrate the concept, let’s use one of Gendler’s examples. Suppose you are on one side of the
Grand Canyon and you would like to get to the other side. In fact, this would be fairly easily done
because there is a strong, sturdy bridge from one side to the other. There’s one problem though: the
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bridge is made out of transparent glass. All of the evidence you have points to the bridge being
perfectly safe, but every time you approach to try and cross you find yourself paralyzed by fear.
According to Gendler, what is happening here is a conflict between belief and alief. You believe on
the basis of all the evidence, properly considered, that the bridge is safe to cross, and thus your belief
suggests that you should cross the bridge given that you want to get to the other side. On the other
hand, the moment you look down at the clear surface you’re supposed to step onto and see nothing
but the thousands-foot drop to the canyon below, you form an alief with roughly the content
“Really high up, long long way down. Not a safe place to be! Get off!” (Gendler 2008a, 635). Note
the representational (“[the space in front of me is] really high up, long long way down”), affective
(“not a safe place to be!”), and behavioral (“get off!”) content of this alief.
Importantly, while beliefs “change in response to changes in evidence,” aliefs “change in
response to changes in habit” (Gendler 2008b 566). Your evidence that the bridge is safe does not
change the fact that it seems to you that it is dangerous. Of course, this is not immutably so. If you
crossed the bridge every day, or perhaps worked your way up to it by crossing various transparent
bridges suspended above ever-increasing heights, you might come back one day and find that your
aliefs perfectly matched your beliefs as far as the advisability of crossing the bridge was concerned.
The bridge would no longer seem dangerous to you.
With this in mind, we can say that aliefs are a good way to understand the vague notion of
“seeming” that we found in Barnes and Frede. Barnes and Frede describe the skeptic’s mental states
as being concerned with how things seem to them rather than the truth of the matter. It is also
important that the skeptic is different from the “man on the street” in that that seeming could change
(even if neither Barnes or Frede think that it likely that that seeming would change). The language of
alief allows us to understand why this is: a seeming, as alief, is concerned with affective content
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rather than truth-tracking content, and so if one’s affective relationship to the subject at hand
changes (through a change in habit), so could the seeming.
But what benefit does understanding seemings through the lens of alief give us? Mainly, it
allows us to identify the key difference between “seemings” (aliefs) and beliefs: their affective
content. Beliefs, of course, have both representational and behavioral content (or at least, they
always have representational content and often have behavioral content). For example, your belief
that the bridge is safe represents the space in front of you as a safe surface to walk on and suggests
that you should walk on it if you want to cross over to the others side of the canyon. In addition to
this representational and behavioral content, though, your beliefs are also essentially tied to their
ability to track the truth – they are only to be maintained so long as the evidence points to their
truth. Aliefs, on the other hand, do not come with this constraint. What they have in its place is
affective content: while our beliefs are (ideally) ultimately grounded in a more or less dispassionate
review of the evidence, our aliefs are inextricably linked to our feelings regarding their subject
matter. The skeptic’s epistemic commitments, then, as aliefs, are not revisable on the basis of
evidence suggesting the truth or falsity of their claims, but rather solely on the basis of the skeptic’s
feelings towards their content. The aliefs of a skeptic, then, seem potentially much more easily
revisable than the beliefs of a dogmatist. Aliefs can be revised to the extent that one’s feelings can
change, while beliefs can only be revised to the extent that new evidence is acquired.
Pyrrhonist Life and Custom
With this new vocabulary of aliefs in mind, let’s return to our guiding question: what does it
mean to live as a pyrrhonist? In one sense, our answer is clear enough: as we’ve shown in the
previous section, Barnes and Frede both agree that the pyrrhonist suspends judgment on all beliefs
(that is, does away with their beliefs) while maintaining epistemic commitments in the form of aliefs.
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Let’s examine in some more detail, though, what Barnes and Frede say that this shift from belief to
alief would look like in practice.
In fact, Barnes and Frede’s ideas of what the skeptical life looks like are quite similar. This
isn’t quite so surprising when we consider (1) the ultimate similarity we found in their accounts of
the skeptical state of mind in the preceding sections and (2) that Barnes and Frede’s stated goal is
just to explain Sextus’s position, and so they are pulling their account of the skeptic’s life from the
same source material (the Outlines). Theirs and Sextus’ description of the skeptics’ life is
characterized most strikingly by one thing: its similarity to the non-skeptical life. As we saw, Frede
distinguishes the skeptic from the “man on the street” only by the skeptic’s lack of belief that things
really are the way they seem to them – that is, they do not think that their epistemic commitments
track truth. Frede’s skeptic differs from the man on the street in that their mental states are aliefs
rather than beliefs, but the representational content of the skeptic’s aliefs may be (and, as Frede
presents it, seem almost entirely to be) exactly the same as the representational content of the man
on the street’s beliefs. Barnes’ position is quite similar, with his fourfold demonstration of how the
skeptic can, through seemings and avowals, eat and drink, teach skills to others, make judgments
functionally identical to causal inferences, and even participate in the customs and habits of the day
– in short, a demonstration that nothing need separate the skeptic’s life from that of the “man on
the street.” Of course, one major difference we are glossing over is that the skeptic, having shifted
their commitments from beliefs to aliefs, is supposed to have achieved a state of ataraxia – total
tranquility and freedom from worry – that the man on the street lacks. But what is important for our
purposes is that this difference in emotion will not manifest itself as a difference in action.
How can we explain this overlap in the skeptical life and the dogmatic one? Barnes gives us
one response by saying that the skeptic continues to live like the non-skeptic simply because “it is
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the done thing” – they are used to acting this way. However, while this may be a convincing
argument for why the skeptic’s life could look outwardly identical to the non-skeptic’s, it does not
give any particularly convincing reasons for why their life must look like that. Indeed, many other
options are open to the pyrrhonist once judgment has been suspended on all beliefs – if a pyrrhonist
is simply someone who renounces beliefs in favor of aliefs, they might have all sorts of different
affective commitments, leading them to all sorts of aliefs and all sorts of different actions and
avowals. Nothing, in principle, commits a pyrrhonist to the more or less normal life that Barnes and
Frede describe.
Barnes and Frede’s characterization of the skeptic’s life as basically similar to the nonskeptic’s, then, overlooks the possibility of a skeptical life that does not look similar to their preskeptical life. Indeed, it seems far more likely that a skeptic’s epistemic commitments would change
at least somewhat than that, upon completing their transition to a mental state with only aliefs, the
skeptic would find that the representational content they are committed to and the actions that
content leads them to are exactly the same as they were when they had beliefs. What is needed, then,
is an account of skepticism that allows for a skeptical life different from the non-skeptical one.
Pyrrho and a Pyrrhonist Rejection of Custom
How, then, might we account for the possibility of a skeptic who does not follow custom,
whose life is not similar to the non-skeptic’s? In fact, we might derive at least the beginnings of an
answer from perhaps the most important philosopher one might hope to have on their side in a
debate over pyrrhonism: Pyrrho himself. Much of the material we have about Pyrrho suggests a man
radically removed from custom by his suspension of judgment – the sort of man who would walk
towards the edge of a cliff with the full intention to keep walking, with no regard for common
conceptions like “you’re going to fall off that cliff” or “if you fall off that cliff you’ll die.” Such a life
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would certainly be a good resource to turn to in conceptualizing a skeptical life beyond custom and
habit.
It is important to note right off the bat that we simply do not have much evidence at all
pertaining to Pyrrho’s philosophical positions or how he chose to live his life. Even the most careful
considerations of that evidence (chief among them Richard Bett’s 2000 work Pyrrho: His Antecedents
and His Legacy) admit that there is simply no way to extract anything approaching a definitive
statement of Pyrrho’s philosophy from it.4 There are, however, certain general characterizations of
Pyrrho’s life and thought that have come down to us, most famously Diogenes Laertius’ account of
Pyrrho in his Lives of the Eminent Philosophers. Using this text (which is suspect as a document of
objective history for a number of reasons) as well as some more general considerations of the rest of
the (meager) evidence we have about Pyrrho, we can construct, if not the historical Pyrrho, a Pyrrho
– one who can point our analysis in a useful and productive direction. We will, in Michael Frede’s
words, be approaching Pyrrho “with a preconception of what [we expect] from [him,] determined by
[our] own needs.” This approach is, as Frede rightfully points out, “obviously … not conducive to
an understanding of the history of philosophy” (Frede 276). But achieving such an understanding is
not our goal here, and I think we will find that although this strategy may not be useful for the
history of philosophy, it is quite conducive to philosophy proper.
With that in mind, let us consider what we can say about Pyrrho. First, we can begin with
what we are not interested in. Much of the interpretive focus surrounding Pyrrho’s skepticism has
been placed on the question of whether he, like Sextus, suspended judgment even on the question of
whether one ought to suspend judgment, or whether he held some sort of belief about the

Bett, who wrote an entire book defending an interpretation of Pyrrho’s thought, admits at the very outset that “there is
clearly no prospect of our being able to establish the correctness of any comprehensive interpretation of Pyrrho’s
philosophy” and that his aim is simply “to persuade the reader that [his] own interpretation is more probable than the
alternatives” (Bett 2000, 12).
4
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indeterminate nature of all things which he felt necessitated suspension of judgment on all matters
(this latter view is the modern consensus – although, again, it should be noted that this consensus is
merely the most probable interpretation of a very small amount of evidence, see Bett 2000 and Vogt
et al. 2015). For our purposes, this question is of no importance whatsoever: we will take Pyrrho as
merely one more skeptic who has decided, for some reason or another, to suspend judgment on (at
least) propositions bearing on the truth. Consequently, we can take it that Pyrrho too desires to give
up his beliefs for a life lived only with aliefs. Our focus will mostly be on Pyrrho’s form of life, as
demonstrated through biographical anecdotes.
Bett gives three general characteristic aspects of Pyrrho’s thought: “his avoidance of
opinions and theorizing, … his lack of susceptibility to passions and his disregard of convention”
(Bett 80). The most interesting of these, and the one that most clearly responds to the problematic
we set up for Barnes and Frede’s interpretations of pyrrhonism, is Pyrrho’s “disregard of
convention.” Diogenes gives us a number of stories pertaining to Pyrrho’s eccentricities, which we
might do well to list:
Pyrrho is said to have continued discussions even after his interlocutor departed (Diogenes
Laertius 9.63)
Pyrrho is said to have passed undisturbed past his master who had fallen in a pond
(Diogenes Laertius 9.63) (In some versions of this story the master falls into a ditch, but in all
versions the master is quite pleased with Pyrrho for his detached attitude.)
Pyrrho is said to have walked undisturbed into oncoming traffic, towards the edges of cliffs,
and in the direction of feral dogs, being saved only by friends who pulled him away from these
threats (Diogenes Laertius 9.62)
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These anecdotes paint a picture of a man who seems, at the very least, not overly concerned
with the customs or habits of the day. But perhaps the most telling anecdote is one in which Pyrrho
does conform to a habit we would expect to be followed in everyday life. We are told that once,
when a dog attacked him, Pyrrho ran away (in some versions he climbs a tree to escape) and,
“purportedly said to someone who reproached him that it is difficult to shake off humanity
completely,5 and that the point is to contend as much as possible with life’s challenges6, first through
one’s deeds and then, if that fails, with argument” (Diogenes Laertius 9.66).
What are we to make of this strange statement? First, we can see that the analysis of
pyrrhonism as concerning itself mainly with aliefs maps quite nicely onto Pyrrho’s stated concerns.
The humanity that Pyrrho desires to shake off seems mainly to be, in this case, the disposition to run
away from things that seem scary to him – that is, he desires to change a habit having to do with
certain affective content. Second, and perhaps most strikingly, it seems that Pyrrho sees his task (and
thus, the skeptical task) as one of ridding himself of his humanity. We will flesh out this suggestion
in Chapter 3. Third, we see that Pyrrho acknowledges that this task, the full suspension of judgment,
is a difficult one, and one that must be approached through both actions and arguments. We will
examine the question of how to achieve the skeptical state in Chapter 2 and the conclusion. Above
all, though, what it shows us is that for Pyrrho, the skeptical life has nothing to do with custom. It is
clear that, whatever his reasons, he is disappointed in himself for having fled from the dog. This is
quite a different sort of life than the skeptical life described by Barnes, Frede, or even Sextus
himself. Pyrrho is radically unconcerned with custom and habit, using his universal suspension of
judgment to chart a course so unmoored from the everyday that it seems incomprehensible and

What Vogt et al. translate as “shake off humanity” uses a verb that “typically describes the taking off of clothing” (Vogt
et al. 55). Bett translates the passage as “strip off humanity” (Bett 2000, 66)
6 What Vogt et al. translate as “challenges” “literally means ‘things’ or ‘affairs,’ often in the sense of the troublesome
matters with which one must cope” (Vogt et al. 55).
5
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even ridiculous to outside observers – Bett, for example, rejects the veracity of the stories we have
been examining on the grounds that, if they were true, Pyrrho would have been “a lunatic” (Bett 67).
But it is exactly this appearance of lunacy that is attractive for our version of Pyrrho – this Pyrrho’s
mode of life is so different from the everyday that it makes just as much sense to view it as insane as
to see it as the practical expression of a very radical philosophy. The Pyrrho of Diogenes Laertius,
then, gives us the model of a skeptic who rejects custom that we desired.
The Mental Life of the Skeptic
While Pyrrho provides us with a great example of a skeptical life led without regard for
custom or habit, the picture the stories of his life provide does not yet give us a complete account of
that skeptical life. In particular, while we have a good idea of how Pyrrho’s attempts at suspending
judgment manifested themselves in his actions, we do not have a good idea of the thought process
behind those actions. What we need is an account of a skeptic’s interiority.
For this discussion, it will be most useful to leave Pyrrho behind. This is not because Pyrrho
is a bad model for an aspiring skeptic, but in fact just because he is the perfect model for the aspiring
skeptic: the fleeing-from-the-dog episode outlined above shows clearly that Pyrrho had not fully
achieved a complete state of suspended judgment (and, as we will spell out in the next chapter, it is
unlikely that any individual could achieve such a state on their own at all). Rather, we will consider
the interior state of mind of someone who has already fully suspended their judgment on all beliefs
– that is, someone who has traded in their beliefs for aliefs.
More particularly, we will examine the point where the skeptic and the non-skeptic’s mental
lives will differ most: changes in epistemic commitment. We have said that the skeptic may, or
perhaps is quite likely to, reject and modify their habits – but how does this happen? For someone
with beliefs, their beliefs change when they think that the evidence available to them, in accordance
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with what they take to be the best rational standards for determining the truth, points to some new
belief being better connected to the truth. The customary belief is changed when the evidence
suggests that it is no longer the best candidate to track the truth. What does this process look like for
someone with only aliefs?
The easiest way to approach this question is to think about how the aliefs we currently have
change. Returning to the glass bridge example, we said that the way to change the alief “Really high
up, long long way down. Not a safe place to be! Get off!” into something a bit calmer would be to
train yourself by walking across various other transparent and high-up bridges. With this training,
you could change your habitual fear of such bridges into a habitual calmness.
Already here we have an important insight into changes in epistemic commitment in a
skeptic’s mind: the skeptical rejection of habit is not a rejection of all habit, but only of the particular
habits that the skeptic starts out with. Indeed, such an initial habit is then replaced with a second habit
– we go from habitual fear to habitual calm, for example. Importantly, though, this second habit is
itself subject to revision as well. We might very well train ourselves to feel sad when we encounter
glass bridges in the future, perhaps by playing sad music every time we walk across such a bridge.
But there is an important piece of information that the bridge scenario cannot tell us: why
the skeptic would want to change their habits in the first place. In the bridge example, we wanted to
change our aliefs about bridges because we had a belief that the bridge was not, in truth, something
worthy of being afraid of. The alief was to be changed, then, to better align with the belief. The
skeptic, though, has no beliefs, and this sort of motivation is thus unavailable to them. Without this
conflict between the representational contents of simultaneously held beliefs and aliefs, what could
push the skeptic to want to revise their epistemic commitments?
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The answer is, in fact, fairly simple. Rather than changing because of a conflict between
aliefs and beliefs, a skeptic would change their commitments because of conflicts between two or
more aliefs. It isn’t difficult to imagine scenarios in which two aliefs conflict. Consider a baker who,
because of the great care she takes in her craft, can only make a very limited number of loaves of
bread per day. One day, a homeless man enters her bakery and asks if she has any loaves of bread
she can spare, as he’s very hungry. The baker, being the good person she is, is struck with an alief of
roughly the form “Person in need. Deserving of compassion. Give him some bread.” However,
when she looks down at one of her precious loaves, she is just as immediately struck by an alief like
“One of my only loaves. Need to sell this to survive. Don’t give it away for free.” How can the
baker resolve this tension? If the tension were between two beliefs, it would be resolved by
measuring each option against the standard constitutive of belief: how well they track the truth.
Since, instead, it is in this case a tension between two aliefs, it will be resolved by the standard
constitutive of alief: affect. That is to say, whichever option the baker feels more strongly about will
be the one she goes with. If she feels the affective pull of needing to sell her bread more strongly
than that of helping the man, she will not give him the bread. If she feels more strongly about
helping him than selling the bread, then she will give it to him.
Already we see one possible way that a skeptic might change their habits. Perhaps the baker
has never been in a situation like the one we’ve just described before. While she is a good person
who likes to help others in general, she has never specifically been put in a situation where that drive
to help others has conflicted with her drive to sell her bread. If this is the case, then we might say
that the introduction of this new element (the man who needs food) causes a change in her habits.
Her affective commitment to selling her bread instead of giving it away and her affective
commitment to helping others had never come into conflict before, but now that they do, one will
give way to the greater affective force of the other. The baker’s habitual commitments will be
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changed – for example, from “One of my loaves. Need to sell this. Don’t give it away” to something
more like “One of my loaves. Usually need to sell this. Don’t give it away unless someone really
needs it.” This change will not be immediate – at first, while such a situation is still relatively novel
for our baker, she will have to consider her feelings each time. But as she gets more used to dealing
with people asking her for bread, her response will become habitual, and she will form a new habit.
Let’s say that the baker’s drive to help the man wins out over her drive to sell the bread. In
general, then, the baker, when placed into situations like the one described, will habitually give the
man a loaf of bread. One day, though, she looks at her finances and sees that (it seems to her that)
she is about to go broke and must sell a certain quantity of bread in order to keep her bakery afloat.
She also sees that if she continues to give away bread to the needy at the rate she currently does, she
will not be able to hit that target number. This may seem like a strange thing to say about someone
who has no beliefs – wouldn’t something like “if I don’t sell enough bread my bakery won’t be
profitable” necessarily be a belief? However, let’s remember that Barnes showed us how the skeptic
could use seemings to have all sorts of abstract interior thoughts usually associated with beliefs (like
inferring the presence of fire from the sight of smoke). In this case, then, it is not that the baker
believes that not selling bread will lead to bankruptcy, it is that it seems to her that that would be the
case. The key difference here is that she thinks that not selling bread will lead to bad consequences
not because she believes what her financial documents tell her to be true, but because she feels a
connection between the numbers on the documents and the prospect of her bakery closing.
This situation does not necessarily immediately boost the affective power of her drive to sell
bread. Rather, what is more likely to happen is something like this: on the basis of this information,
a related affective commitment – perhaps the desire to keep her business open – which previously
had not factored into her affective deliberations in cases of bread-giving now exerts its force on the
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situation. This added affective force may not cause the baker to change her ways immediately –
indeed, she is in the habit of giving bread to those who need it – but if it is in general stronger than
the affective force compelling her to give bread in the specific situations she is in, it may just give
her the motivation to begin training herself out of that habit.
This change of heart for the baker, as we have set it up, happens entirely at the level of alief
and affect. No beliefs need be involved for the scenario we have just laid out to happen. What this
shows us is the general structure of how someone with only aliefs – that is, a skeptic – would go
about changing their commitments. In the mind of someone whose epistemic commitments are only
aliefs, those commitments would change due to changes in their affective state. If the affect behind
certain representational and behavioral content waxes or wanes, then the commitment to that
content will wax or wane along with it, alternately shutting out the possibility for alternate habits to
arise or creating more space for them.
There is one final important note to make about the skeptic’s mental state: the skeptic’s
changes in affect and alief will always be rooted in their starting point. We saw, for example, that
what caused the baker to change her bread-giving habit was an affective commitment she already
possessed, which was just boosted by her circumstances. Still though, the fact that changes in habit
and alief will always be grounded in the general structure of affective commitments that the skeptic
starts with does not mean that those commitments are set in stone. The skeptic’s affective
commitments are always open to change, so long as some other commitment comes to be more
compelling than the original one. The reasons this might happen, though, are much broader than the
reasons that one belief might come to seem more compelling than another. Beliefs compete against
each other on the basis of their common goal of tracking the truth. Aliefs, on the other hand,
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compete merely on the level of their affective power. There are as many reasons to change one’s
aliefs as there are reasons to change one’s feelings or shift one’s mood.
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Chapter 2: Why We Should Be Skeptics
In the previous chapter we drew out the distinction between beliefs and aliefs and saw how
we could conceptualize the life of a pyrrhonian skeptic as being lived exclusively through alief. On
such an interpretation, the skeptic suspends judgment on all beliefs, and thus does not hold any
epistemic commitments related to the truth of any matter, but still has plenty of epistemic
commitments unrelated to the truth in the form of affect-driven aliefs which they express through
avowals. We also saw that, contrary to Barnes and Frede’s positions, such an alief-driven
understanding of skepticism would not necessarily commit the skeptic to a life lived in accordance
with the habits and customs they already had in their pre-skeptical life. What the previous chapter
has not shown, however, is why being in that alief-driven state of suspended judgment would be
desirable. This is what this chapter will attempt to accomplish.
In this chapter, we will focus on a specific set of cases (cases of “norm-discordant alief”) in
order to motivate a commitment to the skeptical life as defined in Chapter 1. It is important to note
that I do not think that the skeptical state of possessing only aliefs is preferable to our current state
of holding both aliefs and beliefs at once in all cases. In fact, I think there is a rather large set of
cases where it’s not particularly problematic to have both beliefs and aliefs. When we are eating
dinner, for example, or lying in bed, it doesn’t matter all that much whether we are doing so with or
without beliefs in our head. In those cases, no argument could be made one way or the other – it
would be equally desirable to live them as a skeptic or as a non-skeptic. The cases of normdiscordant alief we examine, however, will serve as an example of a problem that arises for the
belief-haver and does not arise for the skeptic. If I am successful in arguing that these cases cause
substantial problems for those with beliefs, and that those problems could be solved by becoming a
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pyrrhonian skeptic, then they should provide some good reason to want to get rid of our beliefs and
become skeptics.
The Problem of Norm-Discordant Alief
Let’s return to Gendler’s bridge example from the previous chapter. As a refresher: you want
to get across a canyon in front of you, but the bridge that would take you to the other side is made
out of completely transparent glass. You have good reason to believe that the bridge is safe –
perhaps you’ve seen others walk across it and know that people use it all the time – but you alieve
that it is dangerous and that you should not cross. Of course, in the end, you’re going to have to do
either one or the other – you cross or you don’t. This poses a problem: when our aliefs and our
beliefs contradict each other, how should we resolve this tension?
This problem is an example of what Gendler calls “norm-discordant alief,” resulting from a
conflict between the behavioral propensities activated by one’s aliefs and the propensities activated
by one’s beliefs (Gendler 2008b, 570). While the bridge case provides a clear and simple example of
a norm-discordant alief, there are plenty of other cases of conflict between alief and belief that are
both more relevant to our lives and more important to resolve. Of all the examples Gendler
discusses, one of the most relevant seems to be the case of what Gendler, following Jack Dovidio,
calls “aversive racists.” Aversive racists are “people who consciously endorse egalitarian values, but
who have negative feelings towards the relevant racial group that are ‘typically excluded from
awareness’” (Gendler 2008b, 574). Or, in the language of alief, an aversive racist is someone who
holds egalitarian beliefs but finds themselves with racist aliefs. As Gendler tells us, despite their best
intentions, “the legacy of having lived in a society structured by hierarchical and hostile racial
divisions retains its imprint” on the aversive racist. She also gives us a brief summary of some recent
research regarding these issues, which is useful to see some of the real-world relevance of racist alief:
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So, for example, White subjects primed with images of Black faces tend to be faster to identify an
ambiguous image as a gun, and more likely to misidentify a (non-gun) tool as a gun (Payne, 2001.)
Otherwise identical resumés bearing stereotypical black names (e.g. Jamal, Lakisha) are less likely to
result in interviews than resumés bearing stereotypical White names (Emily, Greg) (Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2003.) In both Black and White Americans, fMRI scanning shows greater amygdale
activity — associated with detection of threat — in subjects presented with images of outgroup
(different race) as opposed to in-group (same race) members (Amodio et al., 2003.) And so on
(Devine et al., 2002; cf. also Payne, 2006). (ibid.)

The aversive racist case is only one example of norm-discordant alief. We can easily think of
others, with consequences just as serious for ours and others’ lives. Norm-discordant aliefs can be
anything from biases that we would not endorse upon reflection to philosophical commitments that
we feel we ought not be committed to. Here we might, for example, think of Moore’s famous “here
is one hand” example: if I am an external world skeptic, I may believe that I do not actually have
hands, and yet when looking down, I cannot help but form the alief “here is a hand.” What these
examples show is that the norms our aliefs are discordant with are often extremely important,
worldview-defining issues. Whether or not one is committed to external world skepticism or racist
representational content will have an enormous effect on how one thinks and acts. These cases,
then, show us in the clearest terms possible a conflict between belief and alief. In them, our beliefs
tell us to think and act one way while our aliefs tell us to think and act in almost exactly the opposite
way. It is quite clear, though, that since the questions involved are so fundamental to how we are to
live in the world, these conflicts must be resolved in some way. The goal of this chapter is to show
that pyrrhonian skepticism, a suspension of judgment leaving us with only alief, is uniquely
positioned to satisfactorily resolve these conflicts.
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For much of the discussion in this chapter, we will be focusing on the example of the
aversive racist as a test case. I choose to focus on the racism example for two reasons. First, it is a
clear example of a conflict between alief and belief whose resolution is highly relevant to our lives. It
should not be particularly controversial to say that the tension between racist aliefs and anti-racist
beliefs ought to be resolved. Second, it is perhaps the example where the case for the solution to
conflicts between alief and belief in cases of norm-discordant alief that I most want to avoid
(namely, that these conflicts should be mostly or entirely resolved in favor of beliefs) seems clearest.
The case as presented seems like a clear example of a clash of alief and belief where the belief should
win – of course we should do away with our racist aliefs. On the contrary, though, I will argue that
the skeptical option of doing away with our beliefs in favor of a mental state composed only of aliefs
(which is, it should be noted, quite distinct from simply keeping all of the aliefs we currently have
with none of the beliefs) would be better for us in the long term, and even better for us in terms of
achieving anti-racist goals. If I am able to make this case with this extremely difficult example, then
hopefully it will speak to a certain strength of the argument in general.
Responding to Norm-Discordant Aliefs: Three Initial Options
Three possible responses to norm-discordant aliefs present themselves almost immediately.
First, we could do nothing, leaving our beliefs and aliefs as they are and believing in certain
propositions on reflection while remaining unable to fully commit ourselves to those beliefs
intuitively. Second, we could somehow try to bring our aliefs to into accord with our beliefs. Third,
we could attempt the reverse, bringing our beliefs into accord with our aliefs. While I will ultimately
argue that all of these options fail to resolve the conflict satisfactorily, each of them deserves our
attention as a potential solution to the problem of contradiction between belief and alief.
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Response 1: Doing Nothing
The first possible response to conflicts between alief and belief is also the simplest: do
nothing. This may seem like a very strange thing to suggest. As we have said, these situations
demand a resolution of some sort to the conflict: we must either act in one way or act in the other.
“Doing nothing” is, in this sense, not really an option – something must always be done. Indeed, if
this response was suggesting that we “do nothing” in this sense then it would not even be worth
discussing. But, a bit more charitably, we can see in this response not so much a call to inaction as a
suggestion not to look for a larger solution to the messy problem of resolving tensions between
what we have been calling beliefs and aliefs but which might just as well be called the head and the
heart. Rather than attempting to definitively answer whether it is better to follow our aliefs or our
beliefs, a proponent of this solution might tell us that there is nothing wrong with believing we
should do something that, in the end, we cannot. Indeed, this might just be part of human nature.
Bart Streumer gives something close to a philosophical defense of this position in his
Unbelievable Errors. In this book, Streumer argues for an error theory about normative judgments that
he thinks is impossible to believe. Streumer finds it impossible to stop believing in the existence of
normative judgments, and believes that this impossibility is shared by the rest of us as well. He
argues that certain factors constitutive of belief require a commitment to the existence of normative
properties of some sort, and thus that it is impossible to really commit ourselves to the truth of his
error theory in the way he might like us to (Streumer 132-138). Looking at this description, we might
reasonably say that what is being described is a conflict between belief and alief similar to the cases
of norm-discordant alief we have been discussing. Streumer takes himself to have good reasons to
be committed to the truth of the representational content “normative properties do not exist,” but
finds that he cannot shake his habitual commitment to the idea that they do.
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Streumer believes that this conflict cannot be overcome, but he nevertheless believes that
there is value in giving the arguments he gives for his error theory. More specifically, he believes that
it is valuable to “come close to believing” the error theory, even if he cannot fully commit himself to
it. While unable to believe the truth of his error theory, Streumer can believe that “there are sound
arguments that together seem to show that the error theory is true,” can believe in “different parts
of the error theory at different times,” and can thus form what he calls “a weak partial belief in the
error theory” (Streumer 189). Streumer tells us that “coming close to believing the error theory has
affected [his] confidence in [his] normative judgements” (190).
However, while this partial belief might affect Streumer’s internal confidence, it doesn’t
affect much else. Streumer is clear that not only has coming close to believing the error theory “not
made [him] give up any of [his] normative judgements,” it hasn’t even “affected which normative
judgements [he makes], since it has affected his confidence in all possible normative judgements in
the same way” (Streumer 190). Of course, this isn’t particularly surprising. As we discussed, this
solution does not actually attempt to solve the problem at hand at all, instead merely putting its
stamp of approval on the conflict-ridden status quo.
Streumer believes that his arguments are valuable because merely knowing the truth is
valuable, even if we cannot fully commit ourselves to acting in accord with it. There may be
something to be said for this, but only if we are confident, as Streumer is, that there is no hope of
changing the commitments involved in this conflict between alief and belief. It is quite clear that,
were it possible, Streumer would very much like to change his aliefs to be in accord with his beliefs,
fully committing himself to the truth of his error theory. It is clearly desirable to him that this tension
be resolved. Thus we come to the major problem with the “do nothing” solution to the problem of
norm-discordant aliefs: it only makes sense if we are convinced that no larger reconciliation between
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the two registers is possible. If it were possible to change one’s aliefs to match one’s beliefs (or viceversa), then it would not make much sense at all to content oneself with only a partial commitment
to a belief (or alief) that one feels one should really be fully committed to.
Indeed, it seems quite clear that in many of the cases where we find contradiction between
alief and belief, change is possible. Most straightforwardly, we can look back to the bridge case. It is
quite easy to imagine that we could train ourselves out of the alief that the bridge is dangerous and
ought to be avoided. If this is the case, why should we content ourselves with the paralyzing fear of
the situation as it initially presents itself? Given the means to change our aliefs, it doesn’t make sense
not to do so. I will argue briefly in the next section on the alief changing strategy and in more depth
in the next chapter that, in fact, there is never a case in which it is impossible to change a
commitment of ours. If this is the case, then the “do nothing” option loses all attractiveness. But
even without this more radical argument, the fact that there are plenty of examples of alief/belief
contradiction where it is clearly possible to change our epistemic commitments one way or the other
shows that we need a solution to those contradictions that gives us a little bit more than this one can
offer.
Another Possible Defense of Doing Nothing
Before we move on from the “do nothing” response, we should also consider a point made
by Gendler in “Alief in Action (and Reaction).” We rejected Streumer’s case for doing nothing by
appealing to the general preferability of resolving tensions between alief and belief if they are, in fact,
resolvable. However, Gendler points out that there are some cases “where self-interest seems
unharmed—even aided—and where freedom seems unimpeded—even enhanced—by the presence
of norm-discordant alief.” She lists “theater, cinema, novel-reading, video games, board games,
poetry, metaphor, circumlocution, daydreaming, therapy, roller-coasters and bungee jumping” as
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examples of activities where norm-discordant alief works to our benefit (Gendler 2008b, 571). While
some of these examples do not seem like clear-cut cases of norm-discordant alief to me (for
example, it is unclear to me how daydreaming isn’t a case of imagination, which Gendler explicitly
distinguishes from alief), others do. The rollercoaster case is one of these – the intense thrill of a
rollercoaster is clearly caused by an alief like “Dropping dangerously fast! Scary! Do something!”
(although since you’re strapped in, there’s not much you can do but scream). But we get on the
rollercoaster in the first place because we believe that, in truth, it is completely safe to do so. The
thrill that we are seeking on the rollercoaster stems from the representational content of an alief
(“This is dangerous!”) that is directly in conflict with one of our beliefs (“This is totally safe”). This
seems to be a case, then, where a norm-discordant alief is desirable.
However, while it is true that the pleasure of activities like rollercoasters depends on normdiscordant aliefs in the status quo, it is not necessarily the case that it essentially relies on normdiscordant aliefs. In fact, it seems that a skeptic as we have described them – that is, someone
possessing only aliefs – could easily have an experience analogous to our norm-discordant
rollercoaster rider. This is because the alief activated by being on the ride (“Dropping dangerously
fast! Scary! Do Something!”) is quite different from the alief that would lead you to get on it in the
first place (perhaps “This will be fun. Looks exciting! Let’s go.”). If our skeptic is self-aware enough,
it might even activate an alief along the lines of “This will activate a reaction of fear that I’ll find
exhilarating. Looks exciting! Let’s go!” The role played by belief in our normal rollercoaster rider’s
mind, then, can easily be replaced by an alief in that of a pyrrhonian amusement park-goer. This
seems generalizable to the other cases Gendler discusses: the pleasure of reacting to the scenes we
see in a movie, for example, need not rely on a belief that one is actually in a theater, but might
instead be paired with a second alief to that effect. Since the two conflicting representational
contents that make the norm-discordant alief exciting (“This ride is dangerous”/“This ride is safe”
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and “A monster is attacking me”/“I’m in a theater”) can be temporally separated (in the
rollercoaster we can imagine the first when one is in the drop and the second when one is strapping
into the ride, in the movie we can imagine the first as occurring in the moment of terror and the
second while fearfully eyeing one’s surroundings for an escape”), the excitement of the cases
Gendler discusses can be easily preserved on the skeptical model.
Of course, nothing about the preceding argument would imply that the current model – in
which we derive pleasure from a conflict between a belief and an alief – is any worse than the
skeptical model just described. However, it does imply that, if we find that switching to the skeptical
state would solve cases unlike the rollercoaster, theater, etc. cases described by Gendler (and perhaps
more like the Streumer case or the aversive racist case), then the pleasure derived from these
rollercoaster-like cases would not give us any reason at all to defend the mixed belief-alief model.
Ultimately, then, the argument of this section depends on the argument of the last part of this
chapter, which argues for the preferability of skepticism as a solution to cases of norm-discordant
alief. As with the cases we discussed in the second paragraph of this chapter (eating lunch, lying in
bed), these are cases where it does not matter whether or not we are skeptics. They do not provide
any motivation one way or the other.
Response 2: The Alief Changing Strategy
Next, we have the alief changing strategy, in which we would attempt to change our aliefs to
coincide with our beliefs. In the aversive racist example, this would entail changing the negative
affective associations with the target racial group to a neutral reaction more in line with the aversive
racist’s anti-racist beliefs. At first, the prospects for the alief changing strategy may look grim. The
aversive racist has already fully convinced themselves of the truth of their anti-racist beliefs – there is
not more work to be done there, and yet they retain their racist aliefs. However, while no amount of
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rational argument could persuade the aversive racist to change their aliefs (indeed, as we’ve
discussed, this simply isn’t how aliefs work), it might be possible that an anti-racist alief could be
induced through other means.
Gendler’s Proposal: Actual Rehearsal and Refocusing of Attention
Gendler discusses two possible ways to bring one’s aliefs in line with one’s beliefs. The first
is “actual rehearsal,” in which someone intentionally performs the behavior associated with the alief
they want to have over and over again so as to habituate themselves into eventually actually having
that alief. The second is “refocusing of attention,” which is an attempt at habit formation similar to
actual rehearsal, but this time focusing on intentionally thinking the thoughts associated with the
alief over and over rather than the focus on action of actual rehearsal (Gendler 2008b, 572-3). In
short, both of these strategies attempt to exploit the habitual nature of alief and forcibly instill a
habit in order to instill the target alief. The thinking seems to be that if one can get the behavioral
content (in the case of actual rehearsal) or the representational content (in the case of refocusing
attention), or potentially both, to be habitual, then the affective content will follow.
There are two major problems for the actual rehearsal and refocusing of attention strategies
for alief changing. First, there is the issue of the reliability of the evidence supporting these claims.
Gendler appeals, for example, to a number of studies conducted by Kerry Kawakami et al. as
evidence for the effectiveness of the actual rehearsal method. Broadly, Kawakami’s studies consist in
giving subjects a baseline test of some sort of affective association, exposing them to training in line
with the actual rehearsal model, and then testing them on the same sort of test after the training has
been completed. A subject may, for example, be asked to associate certain potentially stereotypicallycharged words with faces of different races before and after training in which they were asked to
associate positive terms with faces of races generally stereotyped negatively (Kawakami et al. 2005,
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71-2). Gendler speaks as if the results of these studies unproblematically lend support to the actual
rehearsal model, a claim we will problematize soon, but let’s talk for now as if they really did show a
definite reduction in negative affective association after training. There is still a problem here, for the
way in which “negative affective association” is being tested is extremely specific, and quite removed
from real world contexts. Indeed, we might say that the studies have shown without a doubt that
this training can lead its subjects to better associate positive words with certain races when asked to
do so in a word-matching game, but how confident can we be that this matching game proficiency
will translate to real-world reductions in racist harms? How confident can we be, that is, that these
experiments are actually changing racist aliefs and not just instilling a new habit having to do with a
game? Perhaps we can’t be very confident at all. As Kawakami 2005, explicitly tells us, subjects
tested (this time for gender rather than race) not just with a matching game but with a more realworld scenario in which they were asked to choose the best candidate for a managerial position still
exhibited bias:
Nevertheless, the selection of male or female candidates for a managerial position revealed no
difference between Nonstereotypic Association Training and No Training conditions, the same
conditions in which Kawakami et al. (2000) did show a difference in stereotype activation. In the
present study, although extensive debriefing confirmed our assumption that participants were indeed
attempting to choose the best candidate overall, in these conditions there was an overall pattern of
discrimination against women relative to men in recommended hiring for a managerial position.
(Kawakami et al. 2005)

The results of these experiments, then, do not necessarily show as robust an effect on the aliefs we
want to change as we might like. Indeed, it’s not even the case that they show a robust effect even
within the confines of the matching game: Kawakami et al. 2000 tell us that
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The unexpected absence of stereotypic trait activation for the elderly in [this study] raises questions
concerning the generalizability of the training effect. Although it remains unclear why the present
studies provide evidence for the automatic activation of skinhead but not elderly stereotypes, it is
possible that differences in the nature and structure of these stereotypes, or methodological factors in
the present study may have influenced these findings. (Kawakami et al. 2000, 883).

Overall, then, it seems we have some reason to doubt that the studies cited by Gendler really
show that mere repetition can change a biased alief. But even if they could, we run into the second
major problem with these proposed alief-changing strategies. Namely, even in the best-case
scenarios, they only ever work partially on an individual level. None of the studies Gendler cites
claim that issues like racism and sexism can be solved simply by acting and thinking as if one weren’t
racist or sexist. As Gendler notes, these habits are “enormously deep-seated” and instilled almost
from birth (Gendler 2008b, 575). At best, these studies show that techniques like actual rehearsal
and refocusing of attention can lessen the harmful effects of norm-discordant alief. But this isn’t
what we set out trying to do. In this proposed solution to the problem of norm-discordant alief, we
want to bring our aliefs fully into line with our beliefs, not just a bit closer to them. Actual rehearsal
and refocusing of attention, then, do not seem able to get the job done.
Another Way to Change Aliefs: The Long Game
There may, however, be another possibility for the alief-changing strategy. How humans
have thought about big picture, socially important issues – not least on the topic of race itself – has
changed drastically over time. Social and cultural changes have contributed to changing opinions on
all sorts of issues. Gendler herself notes that one of the reasons it is so difficult to combat racist
aliefs is because they are instilled in us as children, and thus very deeply ingrained (ibid.). Given this,
though, it seems quite likely that creating a community in which everyone is taught to be anti-racist
from birth and brought up in such a manner that nothing in their experience contradicts those

40

teachings, would result in a population that has no issues with racist aliefs whatsoever. Indeed, it
seems to me that even aliefs so deeply ingrained as to seem “biological” are open to being changed.
That is to say, we should remember that “human biology” is by no means a static object and if we
truly wished to change something fundamental about our biology, nothing would stop us from
doing so in principle. That is, of course, an extremely abbreviated discussion of whether or not it is
possible for us to change our most fundamental beliefs and aliefs, and it will be returned to in far
more detail in the next chapter. For now, though, we will simply stipulate that any alief might be
changed (in humanity at large, even if not necessarily in each particular individual) by some possible
process, perhaps involving social or biological changes to the status quo. The brief discussion in this
paragraph should serve to give some initial motivation for why this might be a plausible view.
Of course, even in the scenarios we’ve described, our original aversive racist – the one
whose dissatisfaction with not being able to alieve in accordance with their anti-racist beliefs
provided the impetus for our discussion of these larger scale changes in the first place – does not
always get to fully change their own aliefs. This state of affairs, while not ideal, is still preferable to
the status quo for the anti-racist though. First, making the society around them more concordant
with their anti-racist beliefs may make it easier for the aversive racist to habituate themselves into
less racist practices personally, thereby allowing them to shift their own aliefs at least somewhat.
Second, we can probably assume that the aversive racist’s desire to have anti-racist aliefs is not
confined solely to their own aliefs – rather, they most likely believe that it would be better for people
not to hold racist aliefs in general. If anyone, or any community of people, is convinced of the
general preferability of holding some alief that they cannot currently hold, then it is at least slightly
preferable that they work towards the goal of others in the future being able to have those aliefs.
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A Problem with the Alief Changing Strategy
So far, we have discussed the motivation that an individual or community might have to
bring their aliefs into agreement with their beliefs. However, there is a major practical issue that
comes with that proposal. We have been speaking as if the alief we wish to change could be changed
in isolation from other aliefs and as if the end state of the process of changing that alief would be
one in which the sole difference would be a change in that one alief (for example from having a
racist alief to not having one). There are a number of considerations, however, that complicate that
picture.
First, we have shown that changing an alief like the one the aversive racist wants to change
would require social, cultural, and/or biological change on a large scale. The process leading from
the status quo intuitive alief in certain racist representational content to one with non-racist aliefs
would be long and complicated. While on this long and complicated path, there is every possibility
that we would pick up new aliefs and beliefs along the way. New problems and problematics might
arise from various steps along the road to a situation in which non-racist aliefs become the norm,
which would give rise to new epistemic commitments that are not held in the pluralistic status quo.
Second, the same processes that lead us to acquiring new epistemic commitments along the
way to non-racist alief could also lead us to revise existing aliefs and beliefs. New problems and
scenarios arising from the social, cultural, and biological changes necessary for changing the target
belief could lead us to reevaluate beliefs and aliefs that had previously seemed unrelated to the target
alief.
Finally, we might find while attempting to change some alief that that alief rests on other
aliefs or beliefs which must themselves be changed in order to change the target alief. If we find that
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our racist attitudes rest in some way on our belief that race is a meaningful biological category, for
example, then we would have to revise our belief in that in order to revise our racist aliefs.
With all this in mind, we can see that after the immense amount of effort required to achieve
intuitive anti-racist aliefs it’s highly likely that we will end up with a set of epistemic commitments at
least slightly and perhaps very different from the one we started out with, even beyond the target
belief that we set out to change. This poses a problem for the alief changing model: with many of
the surrounding epistemic commitments changed by the path taken to get to the new set of aliefs,
there’s a chance that the arguments that originally made the target alief so appealing would no longer
be as convincing as they once were. That is, in our quest to get our aliefs to match with our beliefs,
we may be led to revise the beliefs themselves. There are two possibilities for why this could be the
case. First, and most obviously, it might be the case that belief in some premise of the argument for
the original belief has been compromised somewhere along the line, and that what was originally
convincing is no longer. But it’s also possible that while all of the arguments for the original belief
remain valid, our new set of epistemic commitments might give rise to new arguments that are even
more convincing than those original arguments are. For example, while the anti-racist initially set out
to convert their aliefs from having negative associations with certain races to not having them, they
may find upon achieving that goal that they think a better goal would be to change their aliefs (and
beliefs) such that race is no longer a meaningful category to them.
Of course, nothing in that scenario would stop us from changing our aliefs again. But doing
that won’t prevent exactly the same problem from arising yet again once we get to our new set of
aliefs. There’s no guarantee that we would ever find a set of beliefs and aliefs with which we are
totally satisfied, even if they seem like they would be completely satisfying when we set out to attain
them. As we noted, it took an enormous amount of effort just to get us from our original set of
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epistemic commitments to the one in which we did not have racist aliefs. It would take a similar
amount of effort to make any subsequent changes to our beliefs. While nothing would technically
prevent us from pursuing this sort of solution to the problem of contradictions between what we
believe and what we alieve, the harms of this approach seem to outweigh the benefits. In effect, it
would require us to be prepared to launch an enormous, perhaps generations-long social project
with no guarantee whatsoever that once we reach the original goal of that project we would be
satisfied with the outcome. And, if we were not satisfied with the state of aliefs we had originally set
out to achieve – as it seems there is a good chance we wouldn’t be – then, in order to rectify the
situation, we would have to immediately set out on another such project. This process could quite
easily repeat itself ad infinitum.
Response 3: The Belief Changing Strategy
Last in this initial set of responses is the belief changing strategy, in which we would attempt
to bring our beliefs in line with our aliefs. This is clearly the least appealing of the three, especially
given the aversive racist case we are working with. More generally, though, it is unclear how this
solution could possibly work practically. As we’ve discussed, our commitment to aliefs is based on
affect, and it is thus possible to imagine that we might change our aliefs to better accord with our
beliefs through some sort of habit-forming process. Commitment to beliefs, on the other hand,
relies on how well we feel them to track the truth. Thus, if we wanted to change our beliefs to better
accord with our aliefs, we would need to convince ourselves that the representational content of our
aliefs in fact tracked the truth better than that of our beliefs. But if we could do this, then that
content would have already been the content of our beliefs. We hold the beliefs we hold because we feel
that they track the truth the best.
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In the best-case scenario for this response, we might imagine certain situations in which
someone felt for some emotional reasons that it would be best to somehow trick themselves into
believing something they did not initially think to be the case in order to better conform with their
aliefs. However, it is difficult to imagine how anyone could convince themselves of the general
preferability of this sort of self-deceiving operation, in which one would systematically trick oneself
into believing that everything one believes to be true is not true anytime a belief conflicted with an
alief.
Finally, even if these considerations aren’t enough to persuade one that the belief changing
model is a bad solution to the problem of alief/belief contradiction, it runs into many of the same
practical problems as the alief changing model does. Specifically, it seems quite likely that in the
course of changing one’s beliefs to better accord with one’s aliefs, new beliefs and/or aliefs would
arise that would also have to be dealt with; or that once the target beliefs are achieved, new aliefs
and beliefs would seem preferable.
A Fourth Option: Skepticism
At this point it may seem that we will either have to endorse the alief changing model or, if
its drawbacks seem too costly, stick with the status quo, with the contradiction between what we feel
we should believe and what we do believe left unresolved (although a case like that of the aversive
racist makes this second option far less attractive). However, there is one additional option open to
us. It is, of course, the position of pyrrhonian skepticism: full suspension of judgment on all beliefs,
regardless of whether they seem to connect to the initial or target beliefs, leaving only aliefs.
As with the alief changing solution, this would require an immense amount of effort to
achieve, perhaps even more than for that option. A similar large-scale societal project would need to
be launched, this time in order to suspend judgment on all beliefs rather than to change certain
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aliefs. There would be a similar amount of unforeseen circumstances along the way as well, and once
we reach the end of this process, we would not be left simply with all of the aliefs we had when we
started, but with a radically changed set of aliefs.
However, once we have achieved this state, it comes with the greatest payoff of any of the
solutions: the total dissolution of the problem of norm-discordant alief that we began with. Of
course, in this state, there would be no beliefs for the skeptic’s aliefs to be in discord with at all.
What conflict there is would be easy to overcome: as we showed in the previous chapter, a skeptic
with only aliefs can easily resolve contradictions between different aliefs on the basis of affect alone.
We should also remember that, because they are tied essentially to affective commitment rather than
truth-tracking, aliefs are far more open to revision than beliefs are.
Let’s apply this to the case of the aversive racist. Our skeptic will begin with some set of
aliefs that they are committed to. Let’s assume that, similarly to the aversive racist, they are initially
committed to aliefs connecting people they perceive to be of certain races to negative affective and
representational content. (Although really it should be noted that it would be quite surprising if our
skeptic actually had these aliefs, since the world as it would need to be in order to produce such a
skeptic would look radically different from our own.) However, reflecting on some other aliefs they
hold, perhaps about treating people equally or some such, the skeptic then comes to the conclusion
that, in fact, it seems like it would be better if they had neutral rather than negative aliefs about
people of different races. At this point we are in a roughly analogous place to when we were
presented with convincing arguments for anti-racist beliefs. However, the skeptical anti-racist has
significantly less trouble moving on from here than their believing counterpart. Indeed, the “change
in feeling” created by the skeptic’s new reflections could easily displace the old commitment to racist
aliefs in favor of non-racist ones. The movement of the entire process of comparison onto the same
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plane (of affect and aliefs) means that all conflicts are actually resolvable in favor of one or another
option rather than locked into a stalemate caused by essentially different standards of judgment
(affect vs. truth).
Therefore, if the skeptic feels they should be committed to some new alief, and if their
commitment to the old alief is based only on affective commitment, then if the force of their feeling
that the old alief ought to be replaced is greater than the feeling that it ought to be kept, the old alief
will fall by the wayside in favor of the new alief implied by their feeling that they ought to feel
differently. Less abstractly, if an alief in racist content is overcome by the feeling that anti-racist
content would be preferable to be committed to, then there are no extra steps necessary in a shift of
commitment from racist to non-racist aliefs. Of course, as we’ve discussed, it may take some
practice before our new non-racist aliefs become habitual, but so long as the skeptic’s anti-racist
affect is stronger we can be assured that it will win out, whether it takes them a second to think
about it or not.
Skepticism’s Strengths
Given all this, the skeptical strategy seems to be the best option for solving the problem of
contradiction we started with. In any case where we feel that one epistemic commitment is
preferable to the commitment we hold in the status quo, changing that commitment is as simple as
having the feeling that it would be better if we did. This is a massive improvement over the alief
changing model, in which immense effort has to be expended every time it is decided that some
commitment should be changed. Once the skeptical state is achieved (itself through a very difficult
process to be sure), on the other hand, very little effort is required to switch commitments.
Because of the relative ease of switching commitments on the skeptical model, the possibility
of a change in commitments along the way to its target commitment doesn’t pose a problem for it.
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While the alief changing model was hampered by the possibility of changes in surrounding
commitments leaving us unsatisfied with the target alief once we’ve acquired it, the skeptical model
can easily deal with an analogous change in surrounding aliefs. If something the skeptic used to
think seemed the case no longer does, then their aliefs can easily shift to accommodate the way
things now seem to them.
The skeptical strategy also holds another important advantage over the alief changing
strategy. Given the immense effort involved in any change of epistemic commitment on the alief
changing model, it seems unlikely that we would pursue any changes in alief which we do not feel
extremely motivated to achieve. Scenarios in which we have only a weak preference for changing a
commitment would not be worth the coordinated effort required to shift from one alief to another.
For the skeptic, though, even the weakest preference in favor of one alief over another is sufficient
motivation to change that alief. So long as the feeling that it would be best to be committed to the
target alief even slightly outweighs the affective force of the initial commitment, the target alief is as
good as committed to.
Finally, and most importantly, the skeptical strategy is preferable because it solves the
problem of contradictory commitments generally. Our discussion of the alief changing model
focused on an attempt to change one alief, for example changing a racist alief to a non-racist one. In
practice, though, we hold many commitments that we feel we should change. Trying to change all of
them on the alief changing model would be a quixotic effort, requiring the constant organization of
large-scale alief-changing projects, the results of each of which would have unforeseen consequences
for all the rest, requiring yet more projects to be organized, ad nauseum. Skeptical suspension of
judgment on all beliefs, on the other hand, represents a clear goal state that solves the problems
posed by contradictory commitments in general.
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Chapter 3: Are All Aliefs Controllable?
In the previous chapter, a large part of the case for pyrrhonian skepticism was the idea that
in a skeptical state of suspended judgment, with only aliefs, we could easily resolve conflicts between
our epistemic commitments. The argument went that since aliefs are all ultimately answerable to
affect, any conflicts between them could be settled on the basis of affect, in contrast to a system
where commitments based in affect and commitments based in tracking truth were pitted against
each other with no clear standard by which to compare them. However, in this chapter we will
introduce a challenge to that argument. In “Alief in Action (and Reaction)” Gendler briefly
mentions that she is “open to the possibility that there are distinct subspecies of alief: innate and
habitual, perhaps—or controllable and uncontrollable” (Gendler 2008b, 570). This is a problematic
possibility for our argument, since the existence of an uncontrollable alief would mean that there
might be some conflicts between aliefs that we cannot resolve, and would ultimately be out of our
hands. While Gendler doesn’t expand much on this idea, it has been elaborated (in different terms)
by other authors, notably David Hume and P.F. Strawson, both of whom argue for the existence of
what we might call innate and uncontrollable aliefs. This chapter will examine their arguments for
the existence of such aliefs and ultimately argue against them that while there may indeed be many
aliefs that are innate, all aliefs are, in at least some sense, controllable.
Part 1: Hume and Strawson’s Naturalistic Challenge to Pyrrhonism
There is a long tradition of responding to the challenge of pyrrhonism, or skepticism more
generally, by denying that it is even possible – that is, by saying that there is something about the
skeptical life that would make it impossible for a human to lead it. We might rephrase this challenge,
too, from there being “something about the skeptical life that would make it impossible for a human
to lead it” to “something about humanity that would make it impossible to live a skeptical life.” With
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this in mind, it becomes clear why P.F. Strawson chooses to give the name “naturalism” to this line
of response to skepticism – it is the view that there is something about human nature would prevent
us humans from leading a pyrrhonian life. In the language we’ve been using, we might say that this
sort of naturalism argues for the existence of innate, uncontrollable aliefs. This section will examine
two different expressions of the naturalist response: Strawson’s own and David Hume’s, from which
Strawson draws heavy inspiration.
It is important to note that Hume and Strawson’s naturalisms are both framed as defenses of
“belief.” However, on closer examination this difference seems more terminological than
substantive. Hume, for example, tells us that “all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are
deriv’d from nothing but custom; and … belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the
cogitative part of our natures” (Hume 1978, 183). This seems to fall under our criteria for alief fairly
explicitly: the references to ultimately resting on “custom” is one tell, but the larger one is Hume’s
placement of belief in the “sensitive” rather than “cogitative” aspect of our nature. That description
seems to track the distinction we made between representational content attached to affect (alief)
and representational affect aimed at tracking the truth (belief) almost exactly. Indeed, this point is
consistent with Hume’s broader attack on skepticism: as we will see, Hume (translating into
Gendler’s terminology) roughly thinks that even though we might believe skeptical positions to be
true, we will never be able to commit to them on the level of alief. In this respect, then, Hume is a
bit like Bart Streumer.
Strawson’s discussion of “undoubtable propositions” also seems to fit fairly well into the
uncontrollable alief framework. Strawson tells us that Wittgenstein, from whom he adapts his
argument,
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distinguishes … between those propositions, or actual or potential elements in our belief-systems,
which we treat as subject to empirical confirmation or falsification, which we consciously incorporate
in our belief-system (when we do) for this or that reason or on the basis of this or that experience, or
which we actually treat as matter for inquiry or doubt—and, on the other hand, those elements of
our belief-system which have a quite different character, alluded to by the figures of scaffolding,
framework, background, substratum, etc. (Strawson 16)

This certainly seems like a distinction between beliefs answerable to truth and beliefs of some other
kind, which we might call alief. Support for this position is bolstered by the fact that Strawson sees
this argument of Wittgenstein’s as continuous with Hume’s argument, which we have seen seemed
to quite clearly place the non-truth-answerable beliefs in a position analogous with what we have
been calling alief. Hume and Strawson, then, are both attempting to defend the existence of some
sort of uncontrollable alief, not open to revision, questioning, or doubt of any kind.
Hume’s Naturalism
The naturalist position is most famously defended by Hume7, who, although often
remembered as a skeptic, took great pains to argue against “the skeptical philosophy.” Hume’s
challenge to pyrrhonism is quite simple, but no less powerful for that simplicity. Essentially, he
contends that no would-be pyrrhonist could possibly overcome the force that nature exerts on us to
be committed to certain representational and/or behavioral content. Taking the proposition that
bodies exist, for example, Hume tells us that the skeptic, although “he cannot pretend by any
arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity,” must nevertheless “assent” to that proposition
because “nature has not left this to his choice” (Hume 1978, 187). Again, this sounds very much like

It is important to note that this use of the term naturalism is quite different from that normally referred to as
“naturalism” in Hume scholarship. As Don Garrett puts it, Humean naturalism usually means “the program of
providing causal explanations for mental or other phenomena” (Garrett 2004) whereas here it means the program of
providing an account of human nature that includes an essential commitment to at least some beliefs.
7
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Hume is telling us that while we may believe that there is no good reason to say that bodies exist, we
have an innate propensity to alieve it. Importantly, Hume is not saying that anything about skeptical
arguments fails in theory, but is rather making a point about practice. His goal is not to answer the
question “should we be pyrrhonists?” in the negative, but to show that the question itself is
“superfluous” – that whether or not we reason our way into thinking that we should suspend
judgment universally, we simply cannot do so. For Hume, “nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable
necessity has determin’d us to judge” (Hume 1978, 183). We could never really be skeptics, because
we have certain commitments which “nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render’d
unavoidable” (ibid.). On this response, whether or not the skeptic’s arguments are correct doesn’t
matter at all – whether or not the arguments succeed, humans will go on alieving that bodies exist
and that causality works, etc. Indeed, this argument applies even beyond the realm of belief: on this
view, a potential skeptic could have all the affective motivation in the world to change their alief that
bodies exist, but would never actually be able to overcome its innate nature. For Hume, the skeptical
challenge to certain epistemological commitments is simply idle.
There is certainly something correct about Strawson’s labelling of this Humean position as a
“naturalism.” Indeed, it is no accident that Hume’s famous Treatise is a treatise of human nature
specifically. The Humean contention is that there is something about some of our commitments that
is so deeply ingrained in us as humans as to be unavoidable. If living as a pyrrhonist is impossible, it
is because to do so would require us to act contrary to our human nature. For Hume, we simply are
committed to the existence of bodies – we have a natural inclination to be so committed that no
argument can overcome. Certain things are simply beyond the human power to doubt.
Indeed, it seems hard to dispute that there is something deeply correct about Hume’s
account. We can readily agree with him that any would-be pyrrhonist trying to suspend judgment,
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“tho’ he can find no error in the foregoing [skeptical] arguments, yet he still continues to believe,
and think, and reason as usual” (Hume 1978, 184). Of course, Hume does not take this to be
universally true of every proposition we happen to believe in at the moment (which would have the
opposite effect as skepticism, leaving us with a totally static set of beliefs absolutely resistant to
change). A more “moderate” skepticism, he tells us, “is a necessary preparative to the study of
philosophy … preserving a proper impartiality in our judgments and weaning our mind from all
those prejudices which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion” (Hume 1955, 159).
Nevertheless, there are certain “clear and self-evident principles” – like the existence of the body
and the trustworthiness of inductive reasoning – that we must necessarily assent to, and from which
all subsequent reasonings will start (ibid.). It is these principles that are, in Gendler’s language, the
innate and uncontrollable aliefs that would prevent a skeptic from resolving at least some potential
conflicts of epistemic commitment.
Strawson’s Social Naturalism
In his Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, P.F. Strawson adds to the Humean picture of
human nature an expanded form of naturalism drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty.
While Strawson broadly agrees with Hume’s response to skepticism, he brings in Wittgenstein to
add to the rigid Humean naturalism a more flexible form of naturalism that he calls “social
naturalism” (Strawson 24). In contrast to Hume’s naturalism, which argues that undoubtable
propositions are those imbued in us by nature, Strawsonian social naturalism8 focuses its attention
on “the language-games we learn from childhood up, i.e. in a social context” (ibid.).

Strawson himself would undoubtably prefer the description “Wittgensteinian social naturalism,” but it is not my goal
here to wade into the depths of Wittgenstein scholarship.
8
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But what does it mean to add this social dimension to the naturalist response to skepticism?
Much like Humean naturalism, it will provide us with a certain set of aliefs not up for debate, on the
basis of which the rest of our cognitive activity will proceed. Strawson musters a number of quotes
from On Certainty to illustrate this function: the propositions provide a “frame of reference,” a
“‘world picture’ which is the “substratum of all my enquiring and asserting,” the “scaffolding of our
thoughts,” or “the element in which arguments have their life” (Strawson 15). Unlike the Humean
naturalist account, though, these propositions are an “inherited background” which “can be learned
purely practically” (Strawson 15-16). On this picture, the propositions in question come not from
some essential human nature, but from “our learning, from childhood up, an activity, a practice, a
social practice – of making judgements, of forming beliefs.” Importantly, these propositions are not
explicitly learned or taught, “but rather reflect the general character of the practice itself, form a
frame within which the judgments we actually make hang together in a more or less coherent way”
(Strawson 19). This marks an important difference between Hume and Strawson: while both defend
the existence of innate and uncontrollable alief, Hume seems to be concerned with the sort of
innateness we might call “biological” – that applies to all humans over all time – while Strawson is
concerned more with what is innate to a more specifically historically and socially situated individual.
Here we might remember our discussion of the aversive racist from the previous chapter.
The aversive racist holds certain racist aliefs innately (in this second, more specific sense of innate),
as a result of being raised in a racist society. Strawson might say that, in a sufficiently racist society,
these racist beliefs could be so deeply-ingrained as to form an essential part of the framework of the
aversive racist’s thinking. No matter how hard they try to convince themselves otherwise, the
aversive racist raised in this society would not be able to shake their racist aliefs because they form
an essential part of who they are as a person and how they think. Perhaps something about how they
have conceptualized the concept of “people” was, from birth, inextricably linked with the concept of
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race. Wittgenstein tells us that in order to doubt something, we need to be able to conceive of what
it would mean to be mistaken about it (OC 15, 32). Undoubtable propositions are those for which it
is unclear what it would mean to be mistaken about them. If our aversive racist cannot conceptualize
the concept “person” without racial identity, then what would it mean to them to say “I thought I
saw a person who had a race, but I was wrong?” Wittgenstein seems to be saying that such a
statement can have no meaning at all for them, that it would be nonsense, or at least, “a misfiring
attempt to express what can’t be expressed like that” (OC 37). Indeed, we might imagine that the
aversive racist’s conception of themselves as a subject – a person of some sort – and specifically as
the subjects speaking the sentence “I thought I saw a person who had a race, but I was wrong” is a
conception formed in part by practices that take for granted that selves are a kind of person and that
people are always raced. The aversive racist’s commitment to the universality of race, then, is
undoubtable because it is assumed as a condition of the way they speak and think as a whole – it is a
“grammatical” commitment undergirding all of their “language.”
The important difference that opens up between the Humean naturalist and social naturalist
accounts as a result of the different sorts of innateness that they are concerned with is that, on the
social naturalist view, many of the undoubtable propositions may end up being doubtable and
doubted for others down the line. The indubitability of these propositions is a result of our social
inculcation in certain “language games” that take them as necessary conditions, and so a change in
the language game could change what propositions are doubtable. While the aversive racist as we
discussed them in the last paragraph was raised in a society where the concept of race was so deeplyingrained that it became undoubtable to them, for example, we might imagine that their greatgrandchild might conceivably be raised in a society different enough that the same is not the case for
them. The assumptions that make up the background of our experience and reasoning thus evolve
over time, and are imbued not by immutable human nature, but by social context and practice.
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Strawson is quick to point out, though, that he does not take every proposition involved in
the undoubtable scaffolding of our thought to be open to this kind of change, as Wittgenstein
himself seems to. He proposes the introduction of “a principle of distinction, within this class” of
undoubtable propositions (although he notes that such a principle is probably “contrary to
[Wittgenstein’s] inclinations”) (Strawson 17). Here the Wittgensteinian and Humean pictures, as well
as the two forms of innateness we have been discussing, come together for Strawson. This
combined naturalism adds on the one hand a social contextualism to the Humean human nature
picture, and on the other, a (fairly minimal) immutable human nature to the Wittgensteinian
framework picture. As he puts it: “the human world-picture is of course subject to change. But it
remains a human world-picture” (Strawson 27, emphasis original). As a brief outline of what the
essentially human parts of this human world-picture are, Strawson suggests “a picture of a world of
physical objects (bodies) in space and time including human observers capable of action and of
acquiring and imparting knowledge (and error) both of themselves and each other and of whatever
else is to be found in nature” (Strawson 27). Pulling from a quote of Wittgenstein’s, he tells us that
these aspects, like the hard rock at the bank of a river, are “subject to no alteration, or only to an
imperceptible one” (Strawson 17, 27). The unalterable nature of at least some of the commitments
in our cognitive framework is important to Strawson, for if there were no such commitments then
“metaphysical truth would thus be relativized to historical periods,” with commitments like “my
body exists” having no more force than “all people are raced” (Strawson 26).
Part 2: A Response to Naturalism
Broadly, we have seen both Hume and Strawson argue for some form of “indubitability,”
understood as the uncontrollable, undoubtable nature of at least some aliefs. This section will
examine two forms of indubitability proposed by the naturalists, and argue that both are necessary

56

on an individual level, but not a historical level. This will leave open the possibility for skepticism to
be realized on that historical level, although not on the individual one (at least, not for any
individuals presently alive).
For Strawson, it is idle to try to be a skeptic because there are some “propositions” which it
is impossible to doubt. However, we need to distinguish between two ways in which it is impossible
to doubt a proposition on the Strawsonian picture. First, there is the Wittgenstein-derived manner in
which it is impossible to doubt any proposition that is part of the fundamental structure, or
“grammar,” of our thought. Importantly, this sort of indubitability does not apply across times or
across people. That which forms an essential part of my grammar does not necessarily play the same
role for you, or for someone who lived 300 years ago, or who will live 300 years from now. While I
cannot doubt that proposition, that says nothing at all about the proposition itself, but only speaks
to its role within my thought. Secondly, though, Strawson adds an impossibility of doubt that does
apply universally. These are the propositions the belief in which is constitutive of humanity – the
“solid rock” along the riverbanks. For Strawson, no matter what historical or cultural factors might
change what seems to be fundamental and undoubtable in the first sense, nothing could change that
which is undoubtable in the second sense.
This distinction is important for Strawson’s account, and he is right to worry that if such a
distinction is not available, the consequences for his broader philosophical project could be
disastrous. As Strawson points out, this stronger indubitability protects us from having to relativize
our commitments to certain propositions. For undoubtable propositions of the first kind, we have
to say about them “they are undoubtable… for X person” or, more broadly, “they are
undoubtable… given X set of cultural and historical factors.” If those factors change, though, the
propositions in question would no longer be undoubtable. The problem (for Strawson) of using only
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this conception of indubitability goes beyond his stated worries about historical relativization. In
fact, the issue with this first account of indubitability strikes directly at Strawson’s response to
skepticism. If all of our most fundamental commitments were undoubtable in only this first way,
then there is a sense in which the skeptical state of fully suspended judgment becomes possible, and
the question of its pursuit thus becomes not idle at all.
Let’s spell out why this is the case. First, let’s be clear on how this Wittgensteinian position
still provides a certain rejoinder to skepticism. It is impossible, on this view, for any individual to
doubt the propositions making up the framework or grammar of their thought/language. There is
thus no way, on this conception, for an individual already implicated in the various language games
constituting a form of life to doubt the propositions that those language games commit them to.
However, the language games humans are raised with change over time. This is the Strawsonian
worry about historical relativization – the indubitability of propositions that are undoubtable in this
way must always be qualified with a reference to their historically-situated context. But if this is the
case, and if every single one of our seemingly essential commitments were indubitable in only this
way, then all of them would become open to doubt if the right set of historical factors intervened.
Thus, although it might seem far-fetched or unlikely, it would nevertheless be possible for some set of
historical developments to push humans towards a state in which any proposition would be open to
doubt – in short, it would open up the possibility of a skeptical form of life. Even this more limited
possibility of skepticism – skepticism as possible not on an individual level, but on a historical level
– would suffice to show that all aliefs are in some sense doubtable. For we can all, even if only in a
very limited capacity, do our best to affect history, and to push history towards the set of
circumstances that would create the conditions necessary for a pyrrhonian form of life to emerge.
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The second sort of indubitability, then, is an important bulwark for Strawson against the
possibility of skepticism. If the indubitability of some commitments is not dependent on historical
circumstance, then no historical development could make them doubtable. The possibility of a
skeptical form of life would thus remain closed, with that set of really undoubtable aliefs serving as
an impassable barrier that the would-be skeptic could never cross. If we wish to defend the
possibility of skepticism, even the more limited sort of possibility suggested above, we will have to
offer an argument against this second indubitability.
The first step in arguing against the second indubitability is understanding what exactly it is
that distinguishes aliefs indubitable in this way from those indubitable in the first way. Strawson tells
us that he is talking about the “aspects of our world picture, our frame of reference” to which “our
human or natural commitment is so profound that they stand fast, and may be counted on to stand
fast, through all revolutions of scientific thought or social development” (Strawson 27). The key
phrase for understanding the nature of the second sort of indubitability is “human or natural
commitment.” First, there is a slight question of whether this “or” should be read as expressing an
equivalence between “human commitment” and “natural commitment” or as suggesting that these
two commitments differ but that either sort of commitment would fulfill the purposes of the
indubitability he is setting up. I think the first reading, that of equivalence, makes the most sense
here. First, Strawson does not suggest anywhere else that there are two ways in which these
propositions can be undoubtable. Indeed, he tells us that he is giving “a [singular] principle of
distinction, within this class” of indubitable propositions (Strawson 17). Secondly, it seems clear that
Strawson means to say that this natural principle is one that is natural for humans specifically – that
the propositions that are indubitable in this special way are distinctive in that they contribute to a
specifically “human world-picture” (Strawson 27, emphasis original).
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So, aliefs undoubtable in the second way are, for Strawson, undoubtable because they are
natural to humans, essential to humanity. But what exactly does this mean? There are two possible
explanations. First, Strawson may be saying that the mode of thought particular to the biological
species known as humanity is characterized in some essential way by its commitments to these aliefs.
Second, Strawson may be positing some principle of humanity above and beyond the biological –
some sort of human soul, or a human nature beyond the simply biological description of Homo
sapiens. The first interpretation seems immensely more plausible. Strawson says nothing to suggest
that he believes humanity to have some special, extra-scientific status, or to suggest that the
epistemic commitments constitutive of human nature stand in any sort of relationship to some
immaterial human soul. If this is the case, then the second sort of indubitability described by
Strawson is the same as Hume’s indubitability. Both are grounded in a description of human nature
that is itself grounded in a more or less scientific account of “nature.” What is natural to humans is
so insofar as it comes from nature. What is essential to humans is essential to them as a biological
species. This similarity means that a rejection of the second case of indubitability in Strawson will
also constitute a rejection of Hume’s naturalistic response to skepticism.
So, with the explication of Strawson’s second, stronger account of indubitability out of the
way, it is time to provide the argument against that account. If the stronger Humean/Strawsonian
naturalistic response to skepticism rests on a claim about what is natural for humans as a species,
one major problem presents itself immediately. Humanity as a biological category is not
transhistorical. The species Homo sapiens emerged historically, as a result of historical forces like
evolution. It may be correct to characterize certain belief commitments as essential to the human
mind, as Hume and Strawson do, but this leaves an essential question unanswered: why should
humans be committed to maintaining their humanity? Human nature may be an immutably correct
description of the human form of life, but humanity as a species-category existing in history is not
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immutable. Just as proto-human species evolved into humans, picking up certain belief
commitments along the way, humanity might evolve or change in a way that essentially changes its
belief commitments.
Hume and Strawson simply do not consider the possibility of a post-human change in our
belief commitments. This is quite understandable on Hume’s part, living as he did before Darwin,
but it is somewhat more surprising on Strawson’s part. Strawson seems to simply assume that
humanity in its current form is a sort of evolutionary stopping-point. If he did not make this
assumption, then his naturalistic argument against skepticism would not be effective. In order to tell
us that the question of skepticism is an idle one, the naturalistic argument needs to tell us that it is
impossible that at least some commitments could ever be called into doubt. The fact that the manner in
which we might doubt those beliefs would lead us to a form of life so radically different from our
own that it might no longer be considered human is quite interesting, but it does not show that these
doubts are actually impossible.
If we do not take humanity as we currently know it to be the unchangeable endpoint of the
particular evolutionary chain that led to it, then, the naturalistic argument loses its force. If the
“natural” aliefs described by Hume and Strawson are merely an accurate description of a particular
species’ mode of thought, we might think of many things we could do to change that species and
how it thinks. This isn’t to say that such a change would be easy or quick, of course. There are a
number of ways to change biologically ingrained practices, and which methods would be most
applicable for the purposes of the would-be pyrrhonist is a question that is worth exploring further.
It is to say, though, that there is nothing in principle that would stop the species currently known as
humanity from evolving in such a way as to make doubtable the commitments that it currently finds
undoubtable. Thus, even with Hume and Strawson’s stronger claims of indubitability, the weaker
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possibility of skepticism (its possibility on the historical, rather than the individual, level) is
maintained.
We have outlined two senses of indubitability by which the naturalist purports to respond to
skepticism. First, on the more Wittgensteinian account, every individual is essentially committed by
the language games through which they were formed to some grammatical framework which they
can never call into doubt. However, the fact that languages and grammars can change over time left
this sort of indubitability open to the possibility that some set of language games might eventually
produce a form of life in which universal doubt were possible. On the second, stronger account,
some commitments are natural in the sense that they are essential to human nature. But this account
leaves open the possibility of a post-human evolution past these commitments. Neither account of
indubitability, then, can deny the possibility of a skeptical form of life in principle.
There are two important upshots to this chapter: first, that it is possible, in principle, for
conditions allowing for a pyrrhonian form of life in which all aliefs are changeable and controllable
to arise. Second, that the would-be skeptics who might push to actualize those conditions would not
be able to reap the fruits of their labor. As a consequence of both the first and second forms of
indubitability, it is clear that no one alive now, and perhaps no one alive for a number of generations
hence, even if totally committed to skepticism, will really be able to achieve a fully suspended state.
The language games committing us to certain aliefs are too deeply ingrained, our humanity not so
easy to shake off. Nevertheless, the goal is in principle possible, and we can strive to actualize it as
much as we can for ourselves, and to do our utmost to create the conditions for its full realization in
future generations.
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Conclusion
In one of the early sections of the Outlines, Sextus Empiricus addresses the question of
whether skeptics belong to a school. He tells us, unsurprisingly, that if belonging to a school is a
matter of assenting to this or that set of beliefs then the skeptics certainly do not belong to any
school. But interestingly, he goes on to say that the skeptics do belong to a school “if you count as a
school a persuasion which, to all appearances, coheres with some account, the account showing how
it is possible to live correctly” (Sextus I.17). Sextus follows this up by saying that the skeptics
“coherently follow, to all appearances, an account which shows us a life in conformity with
traditional customs and the law and persuasions and our own feelings” (ibid.). This is, as we’ve
discussed, fairly different from our conception of the skeptical life, especially in regards to Sextus’
deference to custom and law, but there is still an important point to be gleaned from his discussion
here. What Sextus shows us here is that the guiding force behind skepticism, the thing that
motivates it, is the idea that it will help us live correctly – that we are living, in some sense, in error,
and that suspending judgment on our beliefs will correct that error.
The custom-breaking skeptical life that has emerged from the discussion in this thesis is a
quite different sort of “correct life” than the one Sextus advocates for, but their motivation and their
method remain fundamentally similar. Sextus found lack of knowledge about the world and conflict
between opposing views on what that knowledge was a terrible problem for anyone attempting to
live their life, and advocated suspension of judgment on all beliefs as a solution to that problem. In
this thesis, I have argued that conflicts between belief and alief on big issue, worldview-affecting
topics like racism are a terrible problem for us as we attempt to live our lives, and I have advocated
suspension of judgment on all beliefs as a solution to that problem. Unlike Sextus, it is unclear to me
what exactly a post-suspension of judgment skeptical life would look like, and indeed, a key part of
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my account of the skeptical life is that it would not look like any one thing. The skeptic as I have
described them is able to change their epistemic commitments much more easily than the dogmatist,
and could swap between different worldviews that would seem impossibly far apart to us today.
The discussion of this thesis has ranged far beyond the scope of the historical skeptics. We
have discussed, among other things, the interpretation of Sextus Empiricus, Tamar Gendler’s work
on alief, and anti-skeptical positions from Hume to Wittgenstein. Despite the breadth of the
argumentation, though, it has all been rooted in the same impulse towards correct living that the
ancient skeptics had. Pyrrho too seemed to share this impulse: Diogenes Laertius tells us that, when
questioned about his strange behavior, Pyrrho replied that he was “practicing to be a man of worth”
(Diogenes 19). Ultimately then, this thesis has been an attempt to defend pyrrhonian skepticism as a
position and a form of life to be taken seriously.
In order to accomplish this goal, we pursued three smaller goals, one in each chapter, which
when added up, constitute such a defense. First, we defined what it would mean to be a pyrrhonist,
and more specifically what it would mean to live a pyrrhonist life. Drawing inspiration from both the
interpretation of ancient sources on skepticism and Gendler’s work on aliefs, we concluded that a
pyrrhonist life would be one lived with only aliefs and no beliefs (those terms understood in the
sense Gendler uses them), and that such a life would most likely be one lived contrary to the
customary way we live our lives today. Second, we gave an argument for the preferability of the
skeptical way of life over a dogmatic, more belief-driven way of life. This argument turned on the
idea that the skeptical mindset is uniquely open to revision of epistemic commitments, and is thus
best-equipped to deal with troubling cases of norm-discordant alief. Thirdly and finally, we defended
the practical possibility of the skeptical life as we described it from the objection that at least some
aliefs are not as revisable as the second chapter’s argument would seem to demand. Against this
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objection, we argued that all aliefs are in fact open to revision on at least a historical, if not an
individual, scale.
Of course, even if every goal set out in this thesis was fully achieved, it would not represent a
fully complete project. The most glaringly obvious absence is a discussion of what it would
practically take to bring the skeptical project to fruition. The third chapter gave a rough idea of what
this might look like with references to “large-scale societal change” and a “historical timeframe,” but
these vague concepts demand elaboration. A fuller discussion of the skeptical project would include
a more detailed consideration of what it would actually take to change society in such a way that we
might suspend judgment universally. Our discussion of Gendler and Strawson suggested that
education might play a large role in such a system. Gendler specifically brought in Aristotle to note
the importance of education to our epistemic commitments, and it seems likely that a broader
consideration of Aristotelian virtue ethics and its project of training one’s character to be virtuous
would be useful for our purposes. Of course, education would not be the only thing needing to
change, as the society surrounding whatever educational system was set up would need not to
conflict radically with that education. This would seem, even minimally, to demand at least some
consideration of social and political changes to our world if we are serious about getting the
skeptical project off the ground. These are, of course, just broad suggestions for directions that
future research in this area might take, but they should serve to show the places in which the analysis
presented in this thesis could and should be expanded upon.
Despite the incompleteness of the project, if I have succeeded in accomplishing the three
goals I set out for myself, then the case for pyrrhonism to be taken seriously would be well on its
way to being made. Of course, it is unlikely that I have fully succeeded to the extent that, for
example, everyone (or perhaps anyone) who reads this thesis will be fully convinced that they ought
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to be a skeptic. Hopefully though, the arguments and positions set forth in these pages serve at the
very least to make the idea of really advocating for pyrrhonian skepticism seem less ridiculous than it
is often taken to be presently. As I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, there have not been
many people who called themselves skeptics since the heyday of the ancient skeptics, and today
skepticism is usually treated more as a stage to be overcome than a tenable position in its own right.
Hopefully this thesis has made that treatment of skepticism seem a bit unfair. And really, this would
not be so surprising – who would deny that philosophers like Sextus Empiricus, Aenesidemus, or
even Pyrrho were intelligent people, with positions worthy of being taken seriously? These ancient
skeptics saw skepticism as a way of correct living, a practical method of solving philosophical
problems. I hope that, in writing this thesis, I have at least sketched a convincing outline of another,
similar set of reasons why the skeptical form of life ought to be taken seriously as a solution to
certain philosophical problems.

66

References
Barnes, Jonathan. “The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist.” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, vol. 28,
1982, pp. 1–29.
Bett, Richard. Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy. Oxford University Press, 2000.
Burnyeat, M. F. Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press,
2012.
Diogenes Laertius. “Lives of Pyrrho and Timon,” translated by Elizabeth Scharffenberger and Katja
Maria Vogt, in Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius, ed. Katja Maria Vogt, Mohr Siebeck,
2015, pp. 16-51.
Fogelin, Robert. Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. Oxford University Press, 1994.
Frede, Michael. Essays in Ancient Philosophy, University of Minnesota Press 1979.
Frede, Michael. “The Sceptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of
Knowledge.” in Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy, edited by Richard
Rorty et al., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 255–278. Ideas in Context.
Garrett, Don. “‘A Small Tincture of Pyrrhonism’: Skepticism and Naturalism in Hume’s Science of
Man,” in Pyrrhonian Skepticism, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Oxford University Press, 2004,
pp. 68-98.
Gendler, Tamar. “Alief and Belief,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 105, no. 10, 2008a, pp. 663-664.
Gendler, Tamar. “Alief in Action (and Reaction),” Mind & Language, vol. 23, no. 5, 2008b, pp. 552–
585.
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press, 1978.

67

Hume, David. An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Bobbs-Merrill, 1955.
Kawakami, Kerry, et al. “Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of Training in the Negation of
Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype Activation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
vol. 78, no. 5, 2000, pp. 871-888.
Kawakami, Kerry, et al. “Kicking the Habit: Effects of Nonstereotypic Association Training and
Correction Processes on Hiring Decisions,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 41,
no. 1, 2005, pp. 68-75.
Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism. Translated by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, Cambridge
University Press, 2000.
Strawson, P.F. Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties. Columbia University Press, 1985.
Streumer, Bart. Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgements. Oxford University
Press, 2017.
Unger, Peter. Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford University Press, 1975.
Vogt, Katja Maria, et al. Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius, ed. Katja Maria Vogt, Mohr Siebeck,
2015.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. On Certainty. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Harper & Row, 1972.

